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ABSTRACT
The following paper examines the ongoing political, legal and cultural debate regarding
heroin maintenance in the U.S. that emerged after the passage of the Harrison Act.
Moreover, it focuses on the United States very brief experimentation with narcotics
maintenance clinics from 1914-1924 and why the clinic system was ultimately
dismantled by the Treasury Department. This paper also highlights the U.S. public policy
debate that emerged as early as the 1950s and continues today to develop heroin
maintenance trials.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Every morning Dan wakes up with the same simple task; obtaining heroin. Before
his feet hit the floor he is contemplating his hustle for the day and wonders who is
holding. Dan is a heroin addict and has been for the past five years. He explains to me
that the good days start with a hold over shot from the night before. Dan uses heroin
anywhere from three to ten times a day depending on how much money he is able to
scavenge thru odd jobs, recycling, and selling small amounts of the drug to other users.
He makes a point to explain to me that he has tried to get clean through traditional rehab,
methadone maintenance and even incarceration. Without knowing so Dan has also just
inadvertently described in a nutshell the current U.S. responses to heroin addiction. Dan
is 27 years old and is an exceptionally bright, funny and kind guy who in all sincerity
wants to get clean but explains that he can‟t because treatment does not work for him and
going to jail only makes him want to use more. As we discussed the perils of heroin
addiction I explained to him that in certain European countries such as Switzerland and
Holland heroin maintenance clinics were developed as an alternative for those whom
abstinence based treatment programs were ineffective. I also informed Dan that similar
programs were actually available in the U.S in the early 1920s as an immediate response
to the Harrison Act, the 1914 federal legislation that criminalized drug use. Dan
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explained to me that he had heard through the grapevine that programs like this existed
but he though they were an urban legend. Dan explains:
Can you imagine if this were allowed here; do you know what this would do for me? If I
could go to a clinic and get clean stuff I could spend the rest of my time on living like a
normal friggin person, I could get a job, an apartment of my own, help take care of my
daughter, and maybe even get a decent girlfriend. But that shit will never happen
here……….not a chance.
Dan is a pseudo name given to the interviewee. Personal Communication, 01 April 2012.
In all reality, Dan is perhaps right and the prospects of heroin assisted treatment in
the U.S. are slim at best although that has not always been the case. There was in fact a
brief period immediately following the passage of the Harrison Act when narcotics
maintenance clinics were developed as a partial response to opiate addiction.

The

premise behind the clinics was if enough addicts were provided narcotics such as
morphine and heroin at low cost then the black market supply would diminish and users
would have more time to pursue legitimate activities such as employment and family.
These clinics operated in cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Jacksonville, FL and
Shreveport, LA from 1914 to 1924 until they were outlawed due to mounting pressure
from the U.S Treasury Department. Brecher (1972) estimates that in 1921 as many as 44
clinics offered heroin and morphine maintenance to an estimated 12,000 addicts. Some
historians note the effectiveness of the Shreveport and Jacksonville clinics while
opponents of heroin maintenance used the New York City facility as documented proof
that the clinics caused far greater harm than good. It is important to note that the New
York City clinic‟s primary goal was to wean addicts off the drug rather than maintain
them whereas most of the other facilities provided long-term maintenance for patients.
Scholars note this important discrepancy along with bad organizational management was
2

largely responsible for the clinics failure (Musto, 2002; Courtwright, 1982). But, these
reasons were largely omitted by opponents of maintenance and the failure of one clinic
overshadowed the marked success of others.
Currently, the U.S. is especially resistant to the idea of heroin maintenance or
heroin assisted treatment (HAT) yet the harm reductionist inspired program has been
adopted in a handful of Western European countries as an alternative to traditional
abstinence based treatment models.

Europe and the U.S. frame opiate abuse based on

fundamentally different ideologies which is evident when we compare their drug policies.
For instance, punitive responses stemming from the “War on Drugs” have served as a
major catalyst in further framing addiction as primarily a criminal justice issue in the
U.S., however, in countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, addiction has been
approached from a public health standpoint that is primarily concerned with minimizing
the harmful effects of drug abuse. In a survey that examined Americans attitudes about
the Drug War only 8% of respondents felt that providing legal access to heroin or cocaine
for maintenance was acceptable (Connelly, 2010). Yet, the majority of Swiss citizens
actually agree that heroin assisted treatment provides societal, health, and safety benefits
for the individual addict as well as the entire community. After a decade of conducting
HAT trials and making the program available to a small number of chronic addicts, the
Swiss government decided to let their citizens decide the programs fate. In 2008, Swiss
citizens passed a referendum to make HAT a permanent treatment option for addicts and
as result the Swiss have witnessed a marked reduction in drug related crime, decreasing
criminal justice and health care costs and improvements of life for the individual addict
(Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino 1998; Rabasa 1998).
3

Regardless of the documented positive outcomes associated with HAT the U.S. is
still largely dismissive of its effectiveness as a legitimate response to chronic heroin
addiction. It may be exceptionally surprising to many that in fact the U.S. was once a
proponent of heroin maintenance through the use of narcotics clinics however their
existence has been largely omitted by today‟s policy makers. The small window in
which narcotics clinics were utilized (1914-1924) is largely forgotten which is
unfortunate because further examination of their effectiveness could prove beneficial in
reopening the debate about the prospects of heroin maintenance in modern U.S. society.
Furthermore, dismissing this element of public policy when addiction was approached
with more tolerance only renders us less likely to develop effective, humane, and cost
efficient alternatives to traditional abstinence based programs that overall have low
success rates among chronic heroin users.
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the ongoing political, legal, and
cultural debate regarding heroin maintenance in the U.S. since the passage of the
Harrison Act. It also highlights the historical emergence of heroin addiction in the U.S.
and the factors that influenced early user trends. Moreover, it focuses on the United
States‟ very brief experimentation with narcotics maintenance clinics from 1914-1924
and discusses the reasons they were ultimately banned by the Treasury Department. This
paper also examines the public policy debate that emerged as early as the 1950s to
develop heroin maintenance programs and it highlights current efforts to develop HAT
trials in the U.S. It is also important to note that there are but a handful of studies and
articles that specifically deal with the United States experimentation with narcotics
4

clinics and there are even fewer that examine the trajectory of implementing heroin
maintenance into public policy.

This paper also examines findings from heroin

maintenance trials in Switzerland and more recently in Vancouver and accesses the
likelihood of a U.S trial in the future.
METHOD
This paper uses a historical comparative analysis to examine the ongoing debate
surrounding heroin maintenance in the U.S. that emerged after the passage of the
Harrison Act. It also closely looks at the brief period in which narcotics maintenance
clinics were utilized and why the Treasury Department who initially supported these
efforts later took an aggressive anti-maintenance stance. Data used in this paper were
gathered using primary sources including: annual reports from the Narcotics Division of
the Department of Internal Revenue, Narcotic Clinics records, Supreme Court Rulings,
and the Treasury Departments studies regarding the prevalence of opiate addiction. Also,
personal accounts are presented from early addicts and physicians including Willis Butler
who ran the Shreveport Narcotics Clinic. This paper draws from the previous work of
historians and drug policy experts such as Dr. David Courtwright and Dr. David Musto
who have examined in detail the United States‟ brief experimentation with narcotics
clinics and why the clinic system was eventually dismantled. Additionally, it examines
the accuracy of several pivotal studies such as Andrew DuMez‟s (1918) Some Facts
Concerning Drug Addiction, and Hamilton Wright‟s (1910) Report on the International
Opium Commission, both of which presented a statistical illusion that grossly
misrepresented the prevalence of opiate addiction.

Nonetheless, these studies were

instrumental in the passage of the Harrison Act which ultimately transformed the
5

dominant attitudes toward addiction from tolerance to criminalization. These studies also
had a significant impact in the ruling of two monumental Supreme Court decisions,
United States v. Doremus and Webb v. United States.

The first upheld the

constitutionality of the Harrison Act and redefined the physician patient relationship
while the latter provided legal precedent that was used by the Treasury Department to
dismantle the narcotics clinics and ultimately maintenance.
In addition to examining the discourse and politics of heroin maintenance this
paper also engages with more recent policy debates to implement heroin maintenance
trials that emerged as early as the 1950s and continued until the late 1970s when heroin
addiction resurfaced as a serious social issue. For example, I examine transcripts from
the American Bar Association and American Medical Association's 1956 Joint
Committee on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1962 White House Ad Hoc Panel on Narcotic
Drug Abuse, both of which advocated policymakers to consider implementing
maintenance trials. The debate regarding heroin maintenance once again laid dormant
through much of the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the shifting conservative discourse
that promoted “Get Tough” policies stemming from the War on Drugs (Trebach, 1982).
Today, the prospects of heroin maintenance are once again being re-accessed due to the
documented positive findings by the Swiss, Dutch and Canadian trials that substantiate
the program‟s effectiveness in reducing drug related harms among high risk chronic
users. This paper also discusses the more recent attempts to implement heroin
maintenance trials in cities such as Baltimore and New York City and why those efforts
ultimately failed. When discussing heroin maintenance or heroin assisted treatment
(HAT) it is almost implausible to do so without examining the Swiss approach. This
6

paper also presents findings from Swiss HAT trials which provides compelling evidence
that it is feasible to maintain large numbers of addicts on heroin in a way that is
acceptable and safe for both the individual addict and the community.
DEFINING HEROIN ASSISTED TREATMENT
This paper uses the terms heroin maintenance and heroin assisted treatment
(HAT) interchangeably, however, the term HAT was not used until the early 1990s
whereas heroin maintenance is used largely to refer to the early U.S. clinics that operated
from 1914-1924. Heroin assisted treatment (HAT) or heroin maintenance is a form of
medical care that involves tightly regulated and controlled prescriptions of heroin that is
offered to a target group of users in which opioid substitution (i.e. methadone and
suboxone) and traditional treatment approaches have been unsuccessful (Canadian
HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2006). HAT evolved based on the theory of “harm reduction”
or “harm minimization,” which attempts to reduce the negative consequences associated
with potentially harmful human behavior. HAT is but one of many programs based on
the theory of harm reduction. Others include: safe injection sites, needle exchange
programs, heroin assisted therapy, naloxone distribution, methadone maintenance, safe
sex programs, and low-threshold health care services. However, this paper focuses
predominately on heroin assisted treatment. The movement of harm minimization or
harm reduction has emerged largely from Western Europe and it is built on the view that
drug policy can have goals other than reducing prevalence and that it may be appropriate
to sacrifice some reductions in use in order to lower the adverse consequences of harmful
behavior such as drug use (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Program evaluations from the
Swiss, Dutch, and even Vancouver‟s HAT trials found the treatment to be effective in
7

reducing drug related harms such as: improving mental and physical health (reducing
exposure to HIV and Hepatitis B&C and improving psychological well-being),
decreasing involvement in criminal activity (committing crimes as a means to obtain
illicit drugs), improving social functioning (securing housing, employment, making drug
free contacts and increasing leisure activities), and decreasing the use of illicit drug use
such as street heroin and cocaine (Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino 1998; Farrell and
Hall, 1998). In spite of the compelling evidence from recent HAT evaluations indicating
that the program is effective in reducing the societal harms that are a direct consequence
of drug use, the U.S. remains largely unreceptive and even hostile to the idea. But a
closer examination of our own history reveals this was not always the case. Judging by
todays ultra-punitive policies regarding drug use it is difficult to imagine a time when the
U.S. had a more humanistic and progressive approach toward drug treatment that allowed
for the maintenance of addicts through narcotics clinics. Though that time was short
lived and maintenance efforts were abandoned due to mounting political pressure from
the federal government, they nonetheless mark a watershed moment in the transition from
tolerance and acceptance of drug use to ultimately stigmatization and criminalization.
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CHAPTER II

THE EMERGENCE OF HEROIN ADDICTION IN THE U.S. AND EARLY USER
TRENDS

In the late 19th century opiates such as morphine were particularly favored by a
cohort of middle-class housewives who used the drug for a range of symptoms from
menstrual cramps to fatigue. Opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine could be found in
practically every imaginable form from the traditional nostrum to coca spiked wine. Yet,
for the most part opiate addiction was not considered a serious social problem until it
made its debut among the ranks of the poor working class and the Chinese (Courtwright,
1982). Although the bulk of this chapter is centered upon the origins of heroin addiction
and the factors that influenced it in the U.S, it would be historically misleading to omit
the role opium smoking played in the narcotic prohibitionist movement of the early 20th
century. It is also important to briefly address morphine addiction and why this drug was
seen as less of a threat than heroin and opium smoking. Was it possibly due to the fact
morphine addicts were predominately older and sicker and more often middle-class
women and Civil War veterans, whereas, early heroin addicts were mostly white poor
working class young men and boys? Moreover, within the span of a century the pattern
of opiate abuse in America has been dramatically transformed to the extent it has
reconstructed how we feel about the problem of addiction (Courtwright, 1982). The
9

following chapter highlights this transformation by examining the emergence of heroin
addiction in the U.S. as well as early user trends and the factors that influenced it.
THE ADVENT OF HEROIN
Heroin was first synthesized by C.R Alder Wright in 1874 and was later marketed
by Bayer Pharmaceuticals in 1898 as an amazing new drug due to its ability to weaken
the cough reflex (JAMA, 1906). Heroin or diamorphine is an opioid analgesic that was
developed by adding two acetyl groups to the molecule morphine. In the medical
community it is referred to a diamorphine, but the name heroin has become synonymous
with its illegal use. Physicians prescribed heroin due to its effectiveness in relieving
symptoms related to respiratory diseases such as pneumonia, tuberculosis, and whooping
cough which were extremely prevalent during the early 1900s (JAMA, 1906). Heinrich
Dreser, a German chemist for Bayer pharmaceutical company was chiefly responsible for
launching the drug in the United States and it was initially well received by the medical
community due to its effectiveness in relieving the cough reflex. It is worth noting that
Dreser was also responsible for developing aspirin which gave physicians an alternative
to prescribe in lieu of opiates and its derivatives.
Heroin was first introduced as a non-habit forming drug and was used as a
substitute for morphine and codeine and in its early years it was even touted as a „cure‟
for the morphine habit. However, physicians quickly noted the addictive nature of the
drug and by 1910 became less enthusiastic about prescribing it. It is also important to
note that the advent of aspirin in 1899 gave physicians an alternative to prescribe in place
of strong opiates such as morphine, codeine and heroin. Terry and Pellens (1928) note it
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was not until 1910 that physicians fully awoke to the danger of the drug and by that time
a great many heroin addicts had been created inadvertently. Yet, some historians note the
prevalence of medical heroin addicts was not as widespread as early accounts indicate.
Pearce Baily (1916) explains that physicians were rarely responsible for introducing the
drug to addicts. Instead, the first dose of heroin was neither pill nor hypodermic injection
taken to alleviate some physician distress, but was a small quantity of powder „sniffed‟
up the nose of a young man under the direction of his peers.
Bailey‟s account is more reflective of available data that indicates heroin
addiction was less likely a product of physician‟s liberal use, but instead a result of
curiosity, dissipation or a substitute for smoking opium. A 1918 study of medical or
intragenic heroin use reveals that only 2 of 50 users became addicted, yet abuse among
non-medical users began to rise significantly as early as 1910 (Sheffel, 1918). A second
study conducted by Stokes (1917) found of the 18 addicts he treated 17 listed
“companions” as the source of their addiction. Unlike morphine which was prescribed as
a panacea for medical conditions from depression to fatigue, heroin was almost always
prescribed for respiratory related illnesses which limited the number of medical users.
A handful of scholars argue that heroin was introduced to the underworld through
less complex channels (Kane, 1917). Some early accounts claim that heroin was given to
prisoners in a New York state penitentiary as a remedy for cough and respiratory related
illnesses. The word quickly spread among prisoners and then to the street that the heroin
pills were “good dope” (Kane, 1917). Although this story was probably true to an extent
it was doubtful that there was a single point of entry for heroin‟s induction into the blackmarket or as the narcotic of choice for the underworld. Instead, it was a combination of
11

factors: the importation bans on opium, the restrictive policies on cocaine, companion
recruitment, and curiosity that led many to the heroin habit.
EARLY USER CHARACTERISTICS
In 1910, non-medical heroin use was mainly concentrated to New York City and
most of its users were young, poor, white and the children of immigrants whose easy
sociability had been developed in the gangs (Bailey, 1916). Geographically, by 1920,
nine out of ten heroin addicts were clustered within a 180 mile radius of Manhattan. This
raises the question of why was New York City so vulnerable to heroin abuse at this time?
Heroin‟s availability in New York and surrounding areas is largely attributed to the
simple fact of geographical convenience. According to Courtwright (1982) by 1915,
many of the major heroin manufactures such as Merek, Bayer, and Schieffelin were
centered in New York City. As a result addicts and their recruits could easily divert large
amounts of the drug into the illicit market.
According to Leahy (1915) the composite heroin addict was a young white male
who lived in a New York slum or a neighboring eastern city. He was also likely to be
poorly educated and if he worked he likely held a blue collar job of an unskilled or
semiskilled variety. For example, many held employment as drivers, painters, news
dealers, longshoremen, bell boys, and soda jerks. But, addicts were not exclusively young
poor white males; heroin was also popular among female prostitutes, gamblers, hustlers
and upper class professionals who had switched from opium after the importation ban.
Many female addicts of the time listed their profession as actress but the large majority of
users were prostitutes who lived with addicted lovers and often shared their earnings and
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drugs together (Courtwright, 1982). Some scholars note that heroin sniffing was a
popular pastime among soldiers prior to WWI and opium smoking was common place for
soldiers stationed in the Philippines (Musto, 1973). Generally, heroin and opiate abuse
was relatively an insignificant problem for the armed forces especially when compared to
the number of civilian addicts. Courtwright (1982) notes, that heroin abuse was not
exclusively limited to one group characterized by class, race or gender, but the average
composite of an addict during the first few decades of the 20th century was likely first
generation American, poor, male and white. Acker (2002) explains, to many upper
middle class Anglo American Protestants this pattern of drug use reflected an alarming
increase in vice which added to their anxieties about the profound social transformations
resulting from industrialization, urbanization and new patterns of immigration. Perhaps it
was not the drug itself that exacerbated the anxieties of the ruling class but what the drug
represented: a changing cultural and social landscape that conflicted with American
hegemonic control.
Early heroin users were also more socially visible than other opiate addicts of the
time such as morphine users who enjoyed their drugs privately. Leahy (1915) explains
morphine addicts were more of the intellectual type and secretive as to their habit and
usually temperate in their dose and on the whole came from more diverse and better
social backgrounds while heroin addicts represented the lumpenproletariat.

Pearce

Bailey (1916) explains hygiene and grooming were frequently neglected by the heroin
user and as a group they would have struck the public as worse than the “normal low”
due to their often pale, emaciated and shabbily dressed appearance. It may be misleading
to describe early heroin uses as exclusively criminals and their gang affiliation was not
13

always pursuant to illegal activities. Riis (1903) explains that a boy‟s affiliation with his
gang and its activities was often casual something he did after school and the same group
that might organize a baseball game or dance might also be found pilfering boxcars or
smashing windows. The gangs basic structure rewarded its most daring and pugilistic
members making the boys all too eager to experiment and indulge in drugs such as heroin
sniffing. Pearce Bailey (1916) explains a common story of experimentation with heroin
starts as:
A group of boys being together at a group or show or some type of social gathering and
one of the boys produces a package or ‘deck’ of heroin and tells the other boys taking it
is wonderfully enjoyable and recommends the other boys try it. They of course want to
follow the majority and go along and try the drug although the first taking is generally
not agreeable, but they try it again and about twenty-five percent become victims of the
habit within a few months (Bailey, 1916 p.314).
Many of these young men were labeled “junkies” and an examination of the
etymology of the word reveals that in the 1920s it was used to describe how many addicts
supported themselves and their habit. Courtwright (1982) notes the word in the literal
sense meant “junkman” because early addicts picked through industrial dumps
scavenging for copper, lead, and iron which they collected in a wagon and later sold to a
scrap dealer. Today, however, the word inspires some of the most negative connotations
imaginable in which many conceptualize emaciated, ragged heroin addicts mainlining in
a dark alleyway. The transformation of the word “junkie” over the past century and its
shift in meaning is largely the result of drug criminalization (Post Harrison Act) and the
transgression of intragenic medical users to non-medical addicts that began to transpire in
the early 1900s (Courtwright, 1982).
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The negative connotation attached to the word also represents the transition of
early heroin sniffers to intravenous users and by the 1940s the heroin mainliner emerged
as the dominant underworld addict type. However, the switch to the needle can also be
seen as a byproduct of the Harrison Act and other restrictive legislation that limited the
legal supply of heroin forcing addicts to secure their drugs through the black-market. As
a means to increase profits peddlers would cut the drug with additives such as baking
soda or laxatives, diminishing its potency and leaving users seeking a new method of
ingestion that would increase the drug‟s euphoric effects (Courtwright, 1982). By 1938,
heroin on average was 27.5 percent pure; although that ratio is very potent compared to
today‟s street heroin which is about 3-5% pure, it was considered highly adulterated by
early users who were accustomed to purer drugs. O‟Donnell and Jones (1970) explain the
intravenous technique likely began accidently when the addict hit a vein and after his
initial fright wore off discovered that this method was even more euphoric than
intramuscular injection.
What is also interesting about early heroin users is they were more likely to be
institutionalized as a result of their drug use more so than other addicts of the time. Data
from the U.S. Treasury Department‟s report “Traffic in Narcotic Drugs” (1919) reveals
that early heroin addicts were more likely to be incarcerated or sent to public institutions
while morphine addicts were more numerous in private hospitals and sanatoriums. Even
one hundred years ago we can see dramatic distinctions in how heroin addiction was
approached when compared to other drug users.

The U.S. Treasury Department

estimated that between 1915 and 1916, there were at least 10,000 heroin addicts
institutionalized in either jails or prisons. However, at that same time there were less
15

than 1,300 heroin addicts in private or public hospitals while there were over 4,000
morphine addicts seeking treatment in hospitals and almshouses. Also, in 1928 of the
623 convicted addicts found suitable for custodial treatment at New York City‟s
Correctional Hospital, 588 (98%) used heroin alone or in combination with other drugs.
Courtwright (1982) notes that heroin addicts were (and still are) behind bars more so than
other opiate addicts due to several reasons: many resort to stealing or dealing drugs to
fund their habit, or because they are reared in the slums and most addicts are single males
in their teens and twenties the prime time for crime with or without drugs. However,
Acker (2002) explains that drug criminalization efforts stemming from the Progressive
Era sought to manage poor and working class urban populations.
CRIMINALIZATION

AND

THE

ORGINS

OF

NON-MEDICAL

HEROIN

ADDICTION
The early origins of non-medical heroin use in the U.S. can be attributed to
several factors. One of the most significant contributions was the Opium Exclusion Act
of 1882 and later the federal ban on smoking opium in 1905. Pearce Baily (1916) notes
veteran smokers and recruits deterred by the ban abandoned the pipe and exchanged it for
more powerful and then legal drugs such as heroin. Opium smoking in the U.S. began
roughly around 1850 and was transplanted to the west coast by Chinese immigrants, but
by the 1880s the trend was popular among whites alike (Courtwright, 1982). The drug
was preferred among prostitutes, gamblers, and other criminals of the underworld but not
exclusively. The white upper class routinely smoked opium at parties and social
gatherings and it became established as the opiate par excellence. Unlike most other
drugs, which were largely done privately or within small groups, opium smoking was a
16

social act due in part to the complexity of the pipe. As a result opium dens became an
integral part of the user subculture. Kane (1891) noted that an individual‟s status was
determined by his adherence to such groups and by his skills in performing the opium
smoking ritual.
By the 1870s, the public‟s fear of opium smoking was heightened because the
practice had spread beyond the Chinese on the West Coast and had become a favored
opiate among white society folks many of which were women. Frederic Poole, a
Philadelphia missionary, notes that white women were being seduced in the dens where
shameless smokers persuaded “innocent girls” to smoke in order to excite their passion
and sexual desire (Courtwright, 1982). The Chinese received the wrath of responsibility
for the opium smoking trade and although they controlled a considerable share of the
U.S. market they were not alone in this endeavor. Unfortunately, the entire Chinese
community was held accountable for the opium trade and the public‟s fear of a Chinese
dominated labor market served as a catalyst that prompted policy makers to act.
By 1875, public outrage directed toward the practice of smoking opium was
translated into drug criminalization first in the form of municipal and state governments
and later at the federal level. These fears were further sensationalized by the press and the
San Francisco chronicle reported that in 1886 15,000 of the 30,000 Chinese living in the
city were addicted to smoking opium (Courtwright, 1982). A San Francisco police officer
even testified at a local hearing that ninety-nine out of one-hundred Chinese in the city
were habituates of the pipe. These numbers were considered exaggerations by some
historians who claim that only one out of twenty Chinese living in the city smoked opium
(Courtwright, 1982). Accuracy aside, these misleading statistics were influential in the
17

first efforts aimed at drug criminalization in the U.S. San Francisco and Virginia were
among the first cities to pass ordinances that penalized those caught possessing or
smoking opium and these efforts were largely targeted at disassembling the public opium
dens.
By 1915, 26 states had some type of anti-opium laws that sought to close public
dens or ban the practice outright. Courtwright (1982) notes, that the state and local
criminalization efforts were largely ineffective do to the laws‟ inconsistencies and
selective police enforcement efforts. For example, the Chinese dens were targeted more
aggressively while white opium smokers took the practice underground. Ultimately, there
were two significant forces responsible for the decline of opium smoking in the U.S:
demographics and federal legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 which
sought to prohibit the immigration of Chinese into the United States. Courtwight (1982)
explains that immigration restrictions and racial antagonisms took their toll, rapidly
decreasing the number of Chinese in America from 103,620 in 1890 to 53,891 in 1920.
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 remains one the most racially restrictive
immigration laws in U.S. history and was a result of deep seated prejudices and the fear
of a Chinese dominated labor market (Lee, 2002). It is also important to note the
significant impact this piece of legislation inadvertently played on opiate user trends
because the Chinese controlled a considerable share of the opium trade in the United
States, and as their population dwindled so did the access to smoking opium. As the
supply of smoking opium diminished users were left with but a few choices: either stop
using opiates completely or switch to a more legal and readily available substitute. There
were a very small handful of users that continued smoking opium regardless of its
18

growing scarcity and expensive price tag but many lacked the privilege of wealth needed
to facilitate their habit. Eventually, even this class of user faced the stark reality that the
stock of smoking opium had practically evaporated. This incited many users to simply
switch to legal opiates that were readily available and significantly cheaper. Some
switched to morphine, but many sought out heroin as a substitute and as a result the
number of addicts consistently grew until the outbreak of WWII. Although the opium
importation ban and the Chinese Exclusion Act both contributed to the growing influx of
heroin users there were other factors at play especially the growing scarcity of cocaine
which also left its users looking for a suitable alternative.
Much like opium, cocaine was an early target of drug criminalization efforts and
as a result its availability decreased leaving many users seeking out opiates such as heroin
in exchange. The alkaloid cocaine was isolated in the 1850s and it was used as a
therapeutic and pain relief agent beginning in the 1880s. Cocaine much like morphine
received early glowing recommendations from the medical community and was
prescribed for a variety of mild to moderate illnesses (JAMA,1900). Patent medical
vendors peddled cocaine-laced tonics and self-treatment was partially to blame for the
spread of addiction. Public outrage toward the drug began to fester as sensationalized
stories of cocaine-intoxicated African Americans filled local newspapers. Charles Terry
(1920) notes that in Jacksonville, FL Blacks were overrepresented among regular cocaine
users as many began to use the drug as a stimulant to increase work productivity. But
when we consider the working and social conditions of Black individuals living in the
Jim Crow South it is not surprising that they sought a stimulant such as cocaine as an
escape to the harsh realities of life. Especially when we consider that at this point the
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drug was legal and peddled in tonics, elixirs and nostrums that were widely available to
all.
According to Courtwright (1982) racially charged fears of Black men erratic and
violent on cocaine fueled the public‟s fears promoting policy makers to impose criminal
legislation on the drug. A South Carolina paper reported that the cocaine habit among
Blacks has grown to be a great evil in many southern cities and the African American
who takes cocaine becomes temporarily crazed and there is no crime which he will not
commit (The Herald and News, 1909). The story also proclaimed that policemen fear the
manic strength and fury of the cocaine intoxicated African American. The Herald and
News (1909) also reported that in Charlotte there are houses where cocaine fiends hold
orgies and these places are filled with crazed demons. Even the New York Times
reported on the false hysteria reporting that most of the attacks upon white women in the
South were a result of the "cocaine crazed Negro brain" (Williams, 1914). These stories
even prompted police officers to adopt the .38 caliber revolver because Black men high
on cocaine could not be stopped by the standard .32 caliber (African American News,
2007). These sensationalized racial fears would be a reoccurring theme in efforts to
criminalize drugs continuing throughout the 20th and 21st century. The so called inner
city crack epidemic is a modern example of these efforts of social control targeting
marginalized groups.
Cocaine use was by no means exclusive to Blacks, the drug was also a popular
stimulant among the white underworld in both southern and northern cities. Much like
the Chinese opium smokers in California, Blacks in the south were singled out as the
most problematic users as a result of racial prejudices making restrictive legislation easier
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to achieve (Courtwright, 1982). Perhaps the South‟s reliance on slave labor and later the
sharecrop system bares some responsibility for cocaine usage among African Americans
during this period. By 1915, most states had passed laws designed to restrict the use of
cocaine to therapeutic purposes and users were required to obtain legitimate prescriptions
through physicians (Musto, 2002). Also, the advent of tropacocaine, novocaine and
stovaine retained the anesthetic properties of cocaine but lacked its euphoric effects
giving physicians and dentists an alternative to prescribe in place of cocaine (JAMA,
1906). Restrictive legislation diminished the supply and inflated the prices of cocaine by
1915 inciting many users to switch to a more accessible and then legal alternative such as
heroin.
DRUG CRIMINALIZATION: THE EARLY YEARS
Acker (2002) explains that drug criminalization efforts stemming from the
Progressive Era sought to manage the poor and working class urban populations. Heroin
and cocaine addicts were among the most targeted user type because they represented a
symbol of irredeemable deviance (Acker, 2002). Public sentiments for the heroin addict
were profoundly different than compared to morphine addicts who were typically seen as
the "object of pity" because they were usually middle class white women or civil war
veterans. Acker (2002) explains that this sympathetic attitude was not extended to the
heroin addict who chose to reject mainstream societies expectations of him. The female
morphine addict obtained inexpensive opiates at little social cost; yet the urban laborer
heroin addict was forced to secure opiates that were increasingly costly in both financial
and social terms. Moreover, at the macro level the early public policy efforts aimed at
drug criminalization shaped the urban social milieu in which the heroin trade was
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concentrated and how heroin addiction would be culturally defined throughout the rest of
the 20th century (Acker, 2002). The progressive era policies that criminalized heroin
were easy to sale to the mainstream public largely because the dominant user type was
portrayed as a deviant urban male.
The press was also complicit in promoting the agendas of prohibitionist reformers
by sensationalizing reports of heroin and cocaine fueled crime committed by the lower
classes. Police also exaggerated the heroin problem and one New York City officer told
reporters that the drug was a "courage builder" for the deviant (New York Sun, 1919).
The article also reported that police statistics demonstrate that to every murder committed
by an alcoholic, there have been four perpetrated by a dope fiend.

According to

Courtwright (1982) much of what we think about opiate addiction in the United States is
dependent upon who is addicted. Early newspaper accounts of heroin addiction support
this assertion and illustrate the responses of law enforcement often times varied largely
based on the socioeconomic characteristics of users. The addicted poor were demonized
as violent uncontrollable dope fiends who would stop at nothing until they got their
drugs. However, archival newspaper accounts reflect a different narrative was presented
when the middle and upper classes fell victim to the plight of heroin addiction.
The New York Tribune (1921) featured a piece about a debutante who became
addicted to heroin after a friend gave it to her for a headache. The debutante who stole
her father‟s car and ran away from home was placed into police custody and confided in
the officer she was a slave to the drug and it controlled her life. Although the officer
found heroin in her possession she was not arrested. Compassionate to her plight, likely a
result of her skin color and social standing, the officer even refused to tell her name to the
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reporter of the cited article. He also said that he made sure she was taken to a place where
she could get the proper treatment for her heroin habit (New York Tribune, 1921). The
Evening Public Ledger (1915) reported a story about an 18 year old girl who was found
unconscious from an overdose of cocaine or heroin during a police raid of known dope
fiend‟s residence. Unlike the earlier story of the heroin addicted debutante whose name
the officer would not reveal, nor would he arrest, the officer in this case had no
reservations about either. Although the woman had been a victim of a drug overdose and
almost died, the police had little sympathy as to her situation. After her recovery she was
sentenced to three months to the women‟s house of corrections in Philadelphia (Evening
Public Ledger, 1915). The juxtaposition of these accounts illustrates the skewed
responses of police based on the socioeconomic characteristics of the user.
PREVALENCE OF OPIATE ADDICTION PRIOR TO WWII
It is hard to provide an exact number of non-medical heroin addicts in the U.S. for
several reasons. Records on addiction at the time were not thoroughly kept and in many
instances early statistics were fabricated to influence public policy on narcotics use.
Historians such as Musto, (1973) and Terry and Pellens (1928) argue that by 1924 there
were around 100,000 to 200,000 opiate addicts (morphine, opium, and heroin) but they
explain even that number must be taken with caution due to the questionable
methodology many early studies used to gather data. One example is Andrew DuMez‟s
(1918) “Some Facts Concerning Drug Addiction” that concluded 750,000 as a
conservative number of opiate addicts in the U.S. Also, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
estimated that there were 1, 500,000 opiate addicts as of 1919.
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Many scholars have rejected these estimates and argue that the prevalence of
addiction was grossly misrepresented to influence prohibitionist narcotic policy (Terry,
1920). Courtwright (1982) also rejects the official estimates cited by both the Treasury
Department and DuMez explaining much of the data gathered in both studies was
fabricated. His analysis of U.S. opium import statistics reveal that the Pre-WWII addict
population reached its climax from 1900-1914 with 313,000 addicts and afterwards it
began to steadily decline until the late 1940s. Hamilton Wright, a Physician and scientist
in addition to a U.S. Senator and the first Opium Commissioner was disingenuous with
his estimates of opiate abuse and did so through manipulating the per capita opium
imports to create an artificially constructed number to use as scare tactic to prompt
narcotic reform policy (Courtwright, 1982). Moreover, some historians suggest that the
peak opiate usage in the U.S. climaxed in 1890 with an estimated 4.59 addicts out of
every 1,000 individuals but afterward that number began a sustained decline. In fact,
opiate and cocaine consumption and related problems had already began to decline on its
own prior to the Harrison Act and the law merely signified already ongoing changes in
social attitudes regarding drug use. Politicians of the time used racial fears, fabricated
statistics and disingenuous arguments to support criminalization efforts.
The methodological flaws of these studies will be addressed in subsequent
sections, however, accuracy aside both DuMez and Wrights official estimates on opiate
addiction had a tremendous impact on the trajectory of narcotics criminalization because
they were cited as evidence by reformers advocating for the Harrison Act and later
presented as facts in the Webb and Doremus Supreme Court decisions. This presents a
very important question; if our nation‟s most influential early narcotics policies were
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based upon exaggerated and distorted evidence then might it be surprising that those
reform efforts have been largely ineffective? Courtwright (1982) explains that, overall
narcotic use was steadily declining on its own prior to the Harrison Act but that soon
changed and within a few decades of its enactment usage rates for heroin addiction far
exceeded that of when the drug maintained a legal status.
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CHAPTER III

AN EXAMINATION OF NARCOTIC MAINTENANCE AND THE POLITICALLEGAL FRAMEWORK USED TO DISMANTLE THE CLINIC SYSTEM

In some regards the Harrison Act was a classic piece of progressive legislation
that attempted to regulate and restrict the sale of narcotic substances and reduce the
number of addicts in America. Initially, the law was no more than a regulation that taxed
the production, importation, and distribution of narcotics such as morphine, heroin, and
cocaine. Many mark the law as the first efforts to criminalize drug users but in its infancy
it was merely a tax regulation. Brecher (1972) explains how the law specifically provided
that manufacturers, pharmacists, importers, and physicians prescribing narcotics maintain
a license and pay a moderate fee. Also, initially patent manufactures were exempted
from these provisions and were not required to pay a tax on products containing opiate
and cocaine derivatives. Section II of the Harrison Act (1914) explains, it is unlawful for
any persons to sell, barter, exchange or give away the aforesaid drugs (heroin, opium,
morphine, and cocaine) except in pursuance of a written order. The law also required
physicians, dentist, and pharmacist to keep records on the dispensation and distribution of
narcotic drugs including patient name and address. Yet, from 1919-1935 more than
25,000 physicians were arrested under the Harrison Act 2,500 of which were sentenced to
prison (White, 2002).
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In all actuality, the Harrison Act simply required physicians, pharmacists,
manufactures, and distributors to provide a tax stamp for narcotics and keep
comprehensive records of the amounts of drugs they prescribed. Ideally, if a physician
was registered, presented his tax stamp and kept carefully patient records then he was
inside the bounds of the law (Musto, 1973). In its infancy, the Harrison Act did not
appear to be a “prohibition law” but the right of a physician to prescribe narcotics proved
indeed problematic because it was spelled out in such ambiguous language. What the law
did not clarify was if physicians could provide maintenance to addicts although many law
enforcement officials interpreted it to mean they could not. Even in the initial months
following the law‟s enactment revenue agents began harassing and arresting physicians
and druggists who provided narcotics to addicts although many provided the appropriate
tax stamp required by the law (Musto, 1973). The legality of a physician‟s right to
provide maintenance as a type of medical treatment under the Harrison Act was brought
forth in two Supreme Court cases, Webb v. United States and United States v. Doremus.
Consequently, a law that was initially created to ensure the market regulation of narcotics
was transformed into a law that redefined a physician‟s autonomy to provide maintenance
to addicts.
UNITED STATES V. WEBB
The Webb decision was handed down on March 3, 1919 and held that a practicing
physician could not issue morphine or heroin to a habitual user in the course of
professional treatment for the purpose of keeping him or her comfortable by maintaining
their customary use. Webb, a practicing physician, and Goldbaum a retail pharmacist in
the Memphis area, were accused of customarily prescribing patient‟s morphine and
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heroin for the sole purpose of maintaining their addiction. According to Section I of the
Harrison Act (1914) Webb and Goldbaum were not in violation of the law and had
registered and paid the tax required of them. But it was the question of maintenance that
was brought before the court.

Justice Day delivered the opinion and concluded

physicians could not provide users opiates with the sole purpose of keeping them
comfortable by maintaining their customary use (Webb et al. v. U.S., 249 U.S. 96). It is
important to note that the courts cited Hamilton Wright‟s “Report on the International
Opium Commission” and Andrew DuMez‟s “Some Facts Concerning Drugs” both of
which grossly overrepresented the prevalence of drug abuse and cited that there were at
least 750,000 if not 1,500,000 addicts in the U.S. The margin in this case was one vote,
which presents an important question; if the Court could have seen a more statistically
accurate picture of addiction and not a fabricated account inspired by political agendas,
would it have affected their decision in favor of maintenance?
The Treasury Department wasted no time in enforcing the decision that provided
them legal precedent to arrest and prosecute physicians and druggist providing users with
maintenance care. According to Musto (1973) by April 1919, less than a month after the
Webb decision was handed down Narcotics Agents arrested several prominent New York
City druggists and physicians who had been supplying hundreds of users with morphine
and heroin as a show of their commitment to enforcement efforts. Musto (1973) notes
that these medical providers had been under the careful eye of the Treasury Department
for months but both the Webb and Doremus decisions gave them a legal basis to
successfully prosecute physicians who provided maintenance to addicts. The Doremus
case is of special importance here for several reasons. First, it upheld the constitutionality
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of the Harrison Act and extended its scope beyond a simple tax measure. Secondly, it
redefined the physician and patient relationship.
UNITED STATES V. DOREMUS
The indictment against Dr. Doremus accused him of unlawfully and fraudulently
prescribing heroin to a patient for the sole purpose of gratifying his appetite for the drugs.
Doremus maintained the proper registration and tax stamp required by the law but the
question brought forth by the court was if maintenance fell within the bounds of the
“professional treatment of an illness or medical condition” (United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S., 86). The lower court held the restrictions on Dr. Doremus's practice were
irrelevant to the collection of revenue powers of the Harrison Act and it overreached the
constitutional powers of the federal government. However, the Supreme Court did not
agree and reversed the lower Courts ruling by a one vote margin.
The first two counts of the indictment against Dr. Doremus claimed that he
distributed a large quantity of heroin to Mr. Ameris (his patient) that was not in
pursuance of a written order form issued by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.
The indictment also claimed that Doremus did unlawfully and knowingly prescribe five
hundred one-sixth grain tablets of heroin not in the course of the regular professional
treatment of any disease from which the patient was suffering (United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S., 86). Instead, the court held that Dr. Doremus knew the patient was popularly
known as a 'dope fiend' and prescribed the drug for the sole purpose of gratifying his
appetite as an habitual user. It also concluded the excessive amounts of heroin prescribed
to the patient may have been sold to other users without paying the imposed tax required
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by the Harrison Act (United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S., 86). The Supreme Court
explained in its decision that the Harrison Act was not unconstitutional and it may be
assumed that the statute has a “moral end” as well as a revenue purpose if the legislation
is within the taxing authority of congress and the majority of Justices agreed it was. The
ruling was a triumph for reformers and it confirmed the constitutionality of the Harrison
Act tax while limiting the manner in which drugs could be prescribed by physicians. The
Doremus decision ultimately redefined the patient-physician relationship by stipulating
narcotics could only be prescribed in the course of professional practice of an illness or
medical condition (excluding addiction) and only and through valid prescriptions (United
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S., 86).
Once again DeMez‟s “Some Facts Concerning Drugs” and the Treasury
Departments “Traffic in Narcotic Drugs” were cited in the Doremus decision although
both studies provided a sensationalized portrait of opiate addiction. With a five to four
vote in favor of upholding the constitutionality of Harrison this presents a very important
question. Had the court received a more reflective account of the prevalence of opiate
abuse would the Justices have ruled differently? Especially when the court the explained
that it may be assumed that the statute has a moral end as well as a revenue purpose if the
legislation is within the taxing authority of congress. This same moral inclination may
have proved less imperative if the addict population was more accurately stated. Instead,
the court cited DuMez‟s “Some Facts Concerning Drugs” which reported there were at
least 750,000 and perhaps 1,500,000 opiate addicts in the United States, however,
Courtwright (1982) explains that there were never more than 313,000 opiate addicts in
America prior to 1914.
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A closer look at DuMez‟s study reveals he may have used fabricated and
inaccurate data gathered from physician and pharmacist surveys to arrive at his
conclusions regarding the addict population (Courtwright, 1982). DuMez relied on selfreporting surveys that attempted to tabulate per-store averages of opiate sales that were
then used to estimate the overall addict population.

This type of methodology is

extremely problematic because the study makes no effort to differentiate between
medical and non-medical users. When later pressed by skeptics to present his original
surveys DuMez postponed the matter until his death.

Nonetheless, DuMez‟s study

dramatically impacted the trajectory of narcotics reform and scholars later document how
statistically inaccurate they were. Musto (1973) and Courtwright (1982) compared
DuMez‟s original estimates from his self-report surveys of physicians and druggist to
opium import statistics from the 1890s to the 1920s. DuMez confidently proclaimed there
could be as many as 1.5 million opiate addicts, however, Musto (1973) claimed that
number was more like 313,000.
The Treasury Department even estimated that there were over 1,000,000 addicts
(though this estimate once again was based on the questionable conclusions of DuMez‟s
and Wright‟s studies) and the abrupt drug restrictions resulting from the Webb and
Doremus decision would likely lead to an increase of crime and possibly even the death
of many addicts (Courtwright, 1982). The Treasury Department reasoned that as „dope
doctors‟ and druggist were arrested and closed their operations some attempt on behalf of
the government was needed to provide addicts with a temporary supply of drugs until
they were cured of the habit (Musto, 1973). The almost idealist reference to “the cure” is
indicative of the naiveté and lack of medical understanding regarding the psychological
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and physiological components of addiction. Drug treatment was in its infancy at this
point and the majority of both the medical and government establishments felt there was
a “cure” to addiction, however, almost a century later it remains undiscovered. Musto
(1973) notes that the state recognized its responsibility for the addicts plight insomuch
that they felt it was necessary to provide temporary relief in the form of narcotics clinics
though they never intended to make them a permanent public health initiative.
The small window in which narcotics clinics existed is unknown to many.
Nonetheless, their existence represents a brief period in U.S. history in which addiction
was approached with tolerance although this tolerance was short lived and eventually
replaced with moral condemnation and criminalization. Ironically, the clinics were
formed at the behest of federal government although they were quickly dismantled by
many of the same policy makers who only a few years prior supported a coordinated
maintenance effort. Specifically, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue explained in
his annual report of June 1919 that provisions must be made for the treatment and cure of
addicts who are unable to obtain supplies of drugs necessary to prevent physical and
mental suffering as this condition may become a menace of life and property (Annual
Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1919). However, attitudes of tolerance
and compassion expressed toward the addict by federal government were quickly
reverted and we can find evidence of this shift by the following year. In 1920, the Annual
Report submitted by the same Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Department marks
a changing discourse toward the individual addict and it cited the newly formed Narcotics
Bureau‟s pamphlet claiming the clinics perpetuated an evil habit in persons who could be
readily cured of their addiction (Musto, 1973). An attitude of moral condemnation
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replaced the matter of fact sympathetic statement cited by the Commissioner only a year
prior largely as a result of the very public failure of the Worth Street Clinic. But, a close
examination of the narcotics clinics reveals that in fact many provided effective
maintenance care for addicts although the failure of one clinic specifically, the Worth
Street clinic in New York City overshadow the marked success of others such as the
Shreveport, Atlanta and Jacksonville facilities.
NARCOTICS CLINICS
As early as 1914, narcotics clinics were being organized as a response to opiate
addiction although the majority of the some 44 facilities were created in 1919 after the
Webb and Doremous decisions redefined a private physicians right to prescribe narcotics
for the sole purpose of maintenance( Courtwright, 1982). The clinics sought to diminish
the black-market supply and steer addicts away from private physicians and apothecaries
who commercialized their vice. The basic philosophy behind the clinics was if enough
addicts were supplied legally and at low cost then the individual would be relived from
depending on

black market peddlers and would thus have more time to devote to

legitimate pursuits such as securing employment, marriage, and family (Musto, 1973). It
was also agreed that some addicts were “curable” and not suited for maintenance care.
Abstinence based rehabilitation programs were offered to many users through either the
narcotics clinics or at local hospitals. It was presumed that if enough addicts were
supplied legally then the black market would diminish thus reducing the crime and harm
that flowed from the illicit drug trade. The clinics also sought to reduce the overall
number of users because if chronic addicts were supplied legitimately then they would be
less likely to recruits new users into the habit.
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The poor and working class were the chief clients of the clinics as those who
preferred not to publicize their addiction and were more financially well to do could
obtain their drugs from private physicians. Morphine addicts were more successful in
securing their supply from private physician‟s especially middle class women and older
more sympathetic patients. According to Musto (1973) many of the narcotics clinics
were an extension of health department clinics used to treat tuberculosis, mental illness,
and syphilis, while others focused solely on treating addicts. The majority of facilities
served small numbers of addicts, but New York City‟s Worth Street Clinic was by far the
largest serving approximately 7,500 users (New York State Department of Health, 1920).
The Table 1 below displays some of the more notable operations although there were 44
documented clinics in the U.S. as of 1924.
Table 1. Narcotic Clinics in the U.S. Between 1915-1924
Clinic Location

Overall Population

Number of Patients

Los Angeles, CA

576,673

481

Hartford, CT

138,036

105

Atlanta, GA

200,616

515

Paducah, KY

24,735

35

New Orleans, LA

387,219

250

Albany, NY

113,344

120

Rochester, NY

295,750

160

Durham, NC

21,719

36

34

Table 1 (Continued)
Youngstown, OH

132,358

65

Providence, RI

237,595

175

Memphis, TN

161,351

325

Houston, TX

138,276

122

Clarksburg, WV

27,869

49

Source: Knob, L. and Dumez, A.G. (1924). The Prevalence and Trend of Drug Addiction
in the United States and Factors Influencing It. Public Health Reports, 39, 1182.
WORTH STREET CLINC
Historians such as Terry and Pellens (1928) explains that, on the whole the clinics
did a remarkably good job containing the spread of opiate addiction except for the New
York City clinic which was a woeful failure. But, it is important to note that the New
York City clinic operated under a different premise than the others because it required
patients to detox off either morphine or heroin completely and often times abruptly.
Also, the Treasury Department was extremely hands on in the day to day operations of
the Worth Street facility and was largely responsible for establishing it as a detox
program. It was also the largest of all the clinics serving around 7,500 addicts whereas
most facilities had an average of 50-75 patients (Musto,1973). The Worth Street Clinic
operated under the New York States Department of Narcotic Drug Control and was
plagued by political and partisan patronage as it was the bone of connection between the
addict population and state, city and federal officials. Dr. Dana Hubbard (1920) who
worked at the Worth Street Clinic explains, some patients sold their excess narcotics to
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other addicts, others recruited friends to register at the clinic to obtain additional drugs
and as a whole the facility was poorly organized and ineffective.
Terry (1920) concluded that the New York City clinic‟s failure was due to its
basic philosophy that regarded the individual addict as a criminal rather than a patient.
Moreover, the clinic was plagued by long waiting times, its inability to deliver medical
care, and lack of confidentiality that allowed addicts to be identified and harassed by law
enforcement officials. Because of the clinic‟s inefficiency and poor record keeping many
patients received excess narcotics that were in turn sold on the black market to other
addicts (Musto, 1973). Opponents of the clinic system used the Worth Street Clinic as
substantiated “proof” that maintenance was ineffective in curbing the illicit drug traffic or
reducing the harms that resulted from the black-market trade. Musto (1973) explains the
New York City clinic was not a maintenance clinic, and its primary function was to give
declining doses of opiates until the patient was completely detoxed, thus because it
served as a detoxification program its failure cannot be used as an argument against
maintenance or to discredit all the early narcotic clinics.

The Worth Street clinic

officially closed its doors in 1920 due to mounting pressure from the New York
Department of Health and the Treasury Department‟s newly formed Federal Narcotics
Bureau, nonetheless, its failure was used as documented proof that maintenance was not
practical and even dangerous (Musto, 1973). Rather than examining more effective
operations such as the Shreveport and Jacksonville facilities and restructuring the Worth
Street Clinic to provide long term maintenance services and improving the organizations
efficiency, it was easier to condemn maintenance as a public health initiative in exchange
for abstinence based treatment models.
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THE SHREVEPORT CLINIC
The Worth Street clinic indeed proved problematic for the maintenance argument
and its failure overshadowed more efficient and effective operations such as the
Shreveport, Jacksonville, and Memphis clinics. Dr. Butler‟s Shreveport clinic is of
particular interest because it was noted by historians as being by far one of the most
efficient operations and it survived until 1923 after the majority of other facilities had
closed their doors (Terry and Pellens, 1928; Courtwright 1982; Musto, 1973). The
Shreveport clinic was one of two facilities that operated in Louisiana and were created at
the behest of the state legislator who saw them as a legitimate and necessary response to
opiate addiction. The Louisiana clinics initially operated with the support of the State
Board of Health which concluded that a permanent cure of those afflicted with drug
addiction disease is impossible in the great majority of cases making maintenance a more
plausible approach (Musto, 1973). The Shreveport clinic maintained the most important
of the Louisiana operations and the overall success and longevity of the program should
be attributed to Dr. Willis Butler.
Dr. Willis Butler ran the narcotics dispensary from 1918-1923 and initially
maintained the support of the Treasury Department who commended his successful
operation although their position reversed by 1923 due to mounting political pressure
from the newly formed Federal Narcotics Bureau of the Prohibition Department. As of
1920, the Shreveport clinic provided narcotics to 542 patients although Treasury officials
were quick to accuse Dr. Butler of overprescribing morphine and heroin to habitués to
secure a lucrative practice for himself. However, Butler (1922) notes that only 211 of the
clinics patients resided in Caddo Parish (where Shreveport is located) and the remaining
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331 patients traveled from nearby localities in search of maintenance care as surrounding
clinics closed their doors. It is also worth mentioning Dr. Butler believed not all addicts
were candidates for maintenance and felt it should be reserved as a last resort for the
“incurables.” Butler explains he carefully evaluated each patient‟s medical background
and user history prior to admittance to the clinic and in many cases recommended addicts
be admitted to an inpatient detoxification program he operated at a nearby hospital
(Butler, 1922).
The Shreveport clinic and Dr. Butler survived multiple investigations led by Levi
Nutt, then chief of the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury Department who was an ardent
opponent of the narcotics clinics and maintenance. However, the investigations into Dr.
Butler‟s clinic revealed a highly efficient operation where every grain of heroin and
morphine was accounted for and his records were without error. After visiting local
pharmacist‟s narcotics investigators found that there was a dramatic reduction in narcotic
prescriptions in the city of Shreveport and local arrest records showed a reduction in drug
related crimes such as theft and property damage (Musto,1973).
The Shreveport clinic continued after many other maintenance facilities were
forced to close their doors in large part due to a local city ordinance that provided a legal
basis for its continued operation in spite of mounting pressure from the Federal
government and Levi Nutt. Moreover, the clinic outlived others as a result of the local
political environment that included the cohesive support of law enforcement, city
officials, and judges all of which felt maintenance was a necessary response to opiate
addiction (Musto,1973). For example, a Shreveport Federal Court Judge concluded he
would vigorously oppose any steps taken toward discontinuance of the clinic because
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from his experiences it had lessened crime in the city (Butler, 1922). The Shreveport
Police Chief cited that crime such as petty thievery and burglary had decreased since the
inauguration of the clinic and he strongly recommended that it not be discontinued.
By early 1923, the Shreveport clinic finally closed its doors as the result of a third
investigation launched by Levi Nutt that claimed the true reason for the clinics existence
was to maintain a large payroll of clinic employees and Dr. Butler was purposely
overprescribing narcotics to patients and was aware many were selling their excess on the
black-market. Although the evidence used to substantiate such claims did not come in the
form of clinics records or corroboration from local law enforcement in fact the local
political establishment commended Dr. Butler‟s clinic and animatedly opposed it closing.
Instead, the clinic was discredited by a single anonymous letter sent to Levi Nutt that
accused Dr. Butler with overprescribing morphine and heroin and fueling the local illicit
market. Dr. Butler concludes in a 1979 interview that the anonymous letter likely came
from a small group of black-market peddlers who saw his clinic as competition
(Courtwright, 1982). Yet, there is an over-preponderance of proof in the form of the
Treasury Department‟s own previous investigations, local law enforcement arrest rates
of addicts, and pharmacy and physicians records all of which substantiate Dr. Butler‟s
clinic had a significant impact in reducing the harms of opiate addiction in the Shreveport
area (Courtwright, 1982).
THE DISMANTLING OF NARCOTICS CLINICS
Terry and Pellens (1928) conclude the Shreveport clinic remains the rallying point
for those who believe a clinic system should have been established across the nation after
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1919. And had it not been for the adamant opposition of the newly formed Narcotics
Bureau of the Treasury Department, headed by Levi Nutt, and John F. Kramer
commissioner of the Prohibition Unit, the Shreveport, Jacksonville, and other well
established operations could have become the nucleus of a national maintenance program
(Musto,1973). Mr. Nutt was especially opposed to the idea of maintenance and avowed
to dismantle the clinic system and did so successfully by threating participating
physicians with prosecution under the Webb and Doremus rulings which upheld the
constitutionality of the Harrison Act. Nutt also used the failure of the Worth Street Clinic
and other poorly organized facilities to sensationalize the fear of maintenance and the
societal harms it could impose.
By 1921, the federal government had officially changed its position on the
narcotics clinics from tolerance to criminalization by using threats, intimidation and in
many cases the prosecution of participating physicians and druggist (Musto,1973). As a
result, physicians who operated maintenance clinics became reluctant and uncomfortable
with prescribing opiates to addicts due to harassment from Revenue agents, the fear of a
time consuming and costly trial, and moreover the very real threat of losing their licenses
and being sent to prison. Musto (1973) explains the successful campaign to close the
clinics is largely attributed to the establishment of a semiautonomous federal agency, the
Narcotics Bureau, which mounted a coordinated attack using 170 agents to dismantle the
clinics. The press was also quick to condemn the narcotic clinics and often praised the
efforts of the Narcotic Bureau for closing them. A Washington Times (1921) article
categorized the narcotics clinics as a failure because the clinics encouraged rather than
curbing the addiction of habitués. The article also applauded the efforts of narcotics
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inspectors and agents who were successfully dismantling the clinics that were
perpetuating addiction (Washington Times, 1921). The failure of the Worth Street clinic
was also cited as proof the clinic system should be abandoned. Ultimately, the Narcotics
Bureau‟s relentless tactics of using threats and intimidation was successful and the all the
clinics had closed by 1923.
Just as hastily as the clinics were developed they were also dismantled with little
thought to the consequences for the addict population. Rather than going back to the
drawing board and reassessing the maintenance approach and striving to make the clinics
more regulated and effective by focusing on more successful facilities such as the
Shreveport and Jacksonville clinics, it was easier to condemn the entire system and
exchange it for strictly abstinence based approaches. In 1924, efforts to provide heroin
maintenance were abandoned altogether due to the passage of the Heroin Act led by
Pittsburg Republican Congressman Stephen Porter. The bill prohibited the manufacture,
importation, and possession of heroin, although very small quantities were reserved for
the advancement of scientific research (Musto, 1973).

The rationale behind the

legislation was if lawmakers could act domestically in limiting the supply of heroin the
international community would soon follow by also banning the manufacture of the drug
thus diminishing its black-market availability and solving the countries heroin problem
entirely. However, in complex societies such simplistic approaches seldom work, and the
1924 law offered no magic remedy to the nation‟s growing appetite for heroin and instead
a thriving black-market replaced a once legal and regulated supply. Although small
numbers of physicians continued to privately prescribe morphine to addicts, the practice
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had largely disappeared by the 1940s as older physicians who sympathized with the
addict died off and were replaced by less empathetic practitioners (Brecher, 1972).
The relentless efforts of reformers, policy makers, along with both federal and
state

law enforcement officials had little impact on diminishing the black market

availability of heroin and instead the number of users consistently increased until the
1940s and then again in the 1960s and consistently thereafter (Courtwright, 1982). User
trends also changed and the drug that was mainly sniffed or orally ingested was primarily
being used intravenously by the mid- 1920s.

As policy makers and the medical

community alike realized that the prohibition and criminalization of opiates, especially
heroin, had little impact on diminishing black-market availability or reducing the addict
population, the debate regarding maintenance reemerged as early as the 1950s.
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CHAPTER IV

RE-EVALUATING NARCOTIC MAINTENANCE

After the clinic system was dismantled there were few resources or effective
treatment options for addicts until the 1960s. For those who could afford they opted for
detoxification treatment in private hospitals but for the majority of addicts this was
simply not an option and most either suffered quietly from a jail cell or privately in their
homes. The debate surrounding heroin maintenance lay dormant throughout much of the
1930s and 1940s largely in part because the overall addict population was relatively small
and at the time the nation was preoccupied with its newly acquired economic prosperity
that stemmed from the war effort. Penalties for those caught possessing heroin and
cocaine were nonetheless punitive and in some cases those convicted of multiple offenses
were given life sentences in prison. Historian David Courtwright (1982) explains heroin
addiction hit a record low during World War II and throughout the 1940s likely because
trade routes for smugglers were disrupted and most Americans were enjoying the
economic stability of the Post-War economy.
As the war came to a close, smuggling routes resumed and by the early 1950s the
heroin problem reemerged.

According to Jones (1996) the second wave of heroin

addiction became a staple of the hipster identity emerging first through the Harlem jazz
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scene and then the Beatnik subculture. Supply routes were also changing and as a result
of the French Connection an increased flow of heroin was smuggled into the U.S. most of
which was controlled by organized crime families. Jones (1996) suggests that beginning
in the 1920s Black northern jazz musicians developed a distinct “hipster” culture that
embraced creativity, spontaneity, freedom and excitement. This also included casual use
of marijuana and heroin. This group of individuals who were largely excluded from the
traditional American dream created their own distinct subculture that thrived in cities
such as Harlem and Chicago (Jones, 1996). It is also important to note that heroin use in
this context did not maintain the negative connotation that is synonymous with its use
today. Jones (1996) further explains for the first time heroin possessed a powerful
articulated cultural meaning along with marijuana as an essential element of the hipster
life. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics however did not agree and those caught possessing
or sailing narcotics were subject to stiff penalties often in the form of long prison
sentences.
Musto (2002) explains that the second wave of heroin use had a significantly
strong impact on African-American and other ethnic minorities such as Puerto Ricans
who had migrated to Chicago, New York, and D.C. during the Post-War years. The
changing user trends that included more and more young men of color produced a so
called “less desirable addict type” and therefore sanctions and measures for control
became increasingly punitive and aimed at incarceration. According to Courtwright
(1982) it would be inaccurate to simply attribute these changes in narcotic policy as
simply a function of the changing addict population. However, the hardline approach
that began Post-Harrison Act would have been difficult to sale to the American public if
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the dominant user type had still been ailing old ladies and crippled Civil War veterans as
was the case in the early 1900s (Courtwright, 1982).
Anti-drug laws increased in severity beginning in the 1930s and continued well
into the 1950s. Musto (1973) explains the peak of drug intoleration reached a climax in
1956 when the death penalty was applied in a case where narcotics had been sold to
minors. These draconian and inhumane responses to drug use were legitimized through
the Boggs Act of 1952, and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. These measures enacted
mandatory sentencing for the possession and sale of narcotics and allowed life sentences
to be imposed for those convicted of multiple violations (Musto, 1973). The Narcotics
Control Act, supported by the FBN, prompted the most stringent drug penalties to date by
introducing the death penalty for certain drug offenses (Cameron and Dillinger, 2011).
However, even before the Post-War heroin problem resurfaced addicts were already
being disproportionately incarcerated. By 1928, less than a decade after the passage of
the Harrison Act and merely five years after the narcotic clinics closed their doors, more
than two-thirds of federal inmates were identified as addicts prompting the congressional
passage of the Porter Act in 1929 (White, 2002). Rather than reassessing the punitiveness
of narcotics laws or providing drug treatment in a community setting as an alternative to
incarceration, the Porter Act mandated the creation of two Federal Narcotics Farms
which were operated under the U.S. Public Health Service.
The first Narcotics Farm was created in 1935 in Lexington, KY and the second in
Fort Worth Texas in 1938, both of which sought to provide drug treatment for addicted
prisoners and volunteers. The Farm in Lexington was an anomaly because it was the first
Federal correctional facility that operated as both a hospital and prison. According to
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Campbell, Olsen and Walden (2008) the Farm at Lexington became the country‟s
epicenter for addiction treatment and research. It was also a gathering place for the
country‟s growing drug subculture and for many a rite of passage that initiated famous
heroin hipsters from the Jazz scene, street hustlers, and drug store cowboys into the
emerging fraternal order of the American Junkie (Campbell, Olsen and Walden, 2008). In
1974, the Narcotics Farm in Lexington operated as a psychiatric hospital until 1998 when
it was established as a Federal Medical Center for offenders with medical and mental
health illnesses.
Considering that drug treatment at this point was in its infancy, the Farms offered
addicts one of the more effective treatment options available at the time. There were
indeed other treatment facilities such as psychiatric institutions, hospitals, and community
care facilities although they practiced a range of experimental and barbaric treatment
methods that inflicted substantially more harm than good. For example, electric shock
therapy, insulin shock therapy, hibernation therapy, morphine aversion (induced nausea)
and the experimental use of lobotomy continued to be practiced on the addict populations
well into the 1950s (Musto, 1973). These treatment methods which were draconian in
nature and like something out of an Alford Hitchcock movie ultimately prompted the
Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association
to implore more effective and humane alternatives for the treatment of substance abuse.
The American Bar Association and American Medical Association Committees
expressed outright opposition to the ultra-punitive Boggs Act and the Narcotic Control
Act that imposed lengthy mandatory sentencing for first time drug offenders. Under the
Boggs Act, a first time offense involving the possession of cocaine, opiates, or even
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marijuana would result in a two to five year mandatory prison sentence (Musto, 1973).
For those convicted of a second offense, a five to ten year sentenced was handed down
and those with a third offense were given ten to twenty years and in some cases life in
prison. Also, the law mandated that after the second offense parole was not offered. The
ABA and AMA Committees recommended increasing both federal and state expenditures
for treating substance abuse as an alternative to incarceration and the committee even
entertained reexamining the feasibility of implementing narcotic maintenance trials
(Breecher, 1972). The ABA and AMA Committee Report marks a very interesting turn
of discourse regarding addiction from the medical community and although it was short
lived it does in fact mark a watershed moment in the policy debate regarding heroin
maintenance in the U.S.
THE ABA AND AMA JOINT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
The Joint Committee on Narcotic Drugs headed by the American Bar Association
and the American Medical Association (1959) in its report expressed dissatisfaction with
the existing narcotic laws and called for the medical rather than the punitive approach
toward addiction. The committee also indicated a positive yet cautious attitude toward
the possibility of adopting British practices that allowed physicians the autonomy to
prescribe heroin in cases of chronic addiction. The British System, as it is commonly
referred to, defined heroin and morphine addiction as a manifestation of a morbid state
and considered it an illness in which physicians could treat by providing addicts with
legal supplies of narcotics (Breecher, 1972). The British system was noted as a success
in diminishing the black market supply of heroin by reducing the overall number of
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addicts to 700 by 1935, and by 1951 it was reported there were only 301 heroin addicts in
the United Kingdom (Breecher, 1972).
After the passage of the Harrison Act and the dismantling of the narcotics clinics
physicians and policy makers visiting the UK were impressed with overall effectiveness
of the British system and upon returning to the U.S. suggested a similar model be tried in
the states (Breecher, 1972). Moreover, many of the proposals recommended by the ABA
and AMA joint committee derived from visits to Britain and observations of how they
addressed addiction by allowing physicians the autonomy to decide when maintenance
was appropriate. According to Breecher (1972) the 1960s, the British System fell under
stiff criticism as a small handful of physicians began prescribing the drug quite liberally
leaving the government seriously reevaluating its approach regarding heroin maintenance
and the autonomy it placed in the hands of doctors.
In 1955, the ABA and AMA joint committee launched a comprehensive study of
narcotic addiction and the laws that prohibited its use. The committee‟s primary
objectives were to create a more sociological and psychiatric-orientated analysis of
addiction and it also sought to reduce the mandatory sentencing of narcotic addicts in
exchange for treatment (Musto, 1973).

The Committee suggested, albeit subtlety,

revisiting the idea of dispensing narcotics in an outpatient clinic environment. The
Committee‟s Interim Report released in 1958 included two appendixes each of which
maintained its somewhat distinct tone regarding its policy recommendations. The first
appendix written by the Committee‟s chair expressed praise for the British System and
also suggested that crime could be curtailed if addicts were provided their drugs.
According to Musto (1973) the Committees report was notably progressive in its
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recommendations but the Federal Bureau of Narcotics wasted no time in refuting its
legitimacy by claiming the report was authored by a bunch of “crackpot” doctors and
sociologists. The Bureau‟s official response came in the form of its own ad hoc advisory
committee, entitled “Comments on Narcotic Drugs: Interim Report of the Joint
Committee of the ABA and AMA” (1959) and it focused on the so called failures of the
old narcotics clinics, most notable the Worth Street Clinic (Musto, 1973). The FBN‟s
response illustrated Anslingers personal opposition for the old clinic system. The report
focused solely on the negative aspects of the New York clinics omitting the more
effective operations such as the Shreveport and Jacksonville facilities (Musto,1973).
The FBN maintained the position that the best “cure” for addiction remained
drying up the supply of narcotics through law enforcement efforts.

Although the

Committee had not directly recommended creating a narcotic dispensing clinic system, it
did advocate for an experimental clinic which never materialized. Had the FBN engaged
in a meaningful dialogue with the AMA and ABA aimed at a more medical
understanding toward addiction the outcome may have been different. However, for the
first time since the old clinics were dismantled the most prestigious institutions of law
and medicine were seriously questioning the countries hardline drug policies.
According to Musto (1973) drug use in the 1950s began to symbolize the
conflicting ideologies between two groups; a new emerging counterculture and the rest of
society, therefore allowing drug toleration might disrupt social harmony and thus
question the old order. There was also the belief that drug use threatened to disrupt the
delicate American social structures (i.e. capital accumulation, wage labor and the class
system) and this line of thinking consequently limited the move toward drug toleration
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such as permitting physicians to prescribe narcotics for maintenance purposes. There
would be other inquiries into the feasibility of narcotic maintenance and the 1962 White
House Conference on Drug Use and Abuse marks another milestone in this policy debate.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY‟S WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTIC DRUG
ABUSE
In his speech during the White House Conference on Narcotic Drug Abuse (1962)
President Kennedy explained that for half of a century the nation has faced persistent
vexatious problems arising from the abuse of narcotic drugs. The president explained it
was a terrible loss to society in the form of human suffering, misery and lost productivity
in the form of wage labor and tax revenue that flowed directly from drug abuse.
President Kennedy (1962) also noted that the current treatments available for addiction
produced discouragingly high relapse rates which were cause for great concern (Office of
the White House Press Secretary, 1962). He also demanded that more effort needed to be
directed toward the social causes of addiction rather than focusing solely on the
symptoms. He also urged that the problem of drug addiction be systematically explored
by both sociologists and the medical community so that more humane and effective
treatment modalities could be developed (Office of the White House Press Secretary,
1962).
The Presidents Ad Hoc Panel of eight M.D.‟s and Ph.D.‟s rejected the accepted
practice of long prison sentences for drug addicts and recommended parole and
mandating community-based drug treatment instead. According to Breecher (1972)
President Kennedy's White House Conference on Drug Use and Abuse stated that it
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would welcome careful, rigorous and well monitored research that would identify if
certain addicts who could not be permanently weaned from drugs could be maintained in
a socially acceptable manner. The Panel was hesitant to publically support adopting the
British Practices toward heroin maintenance or even an experimental clinic. Providing
heroin addicts their drug of choice was not socially accepted but perhaps methadone, a
powerful opiate synthetic, was not precluded from the conversation.
Methadone had been used at the Narcotics Farms since the late 1940s as a
withdrawal aid and in the early 1960s medical trials revealed it could be used safely in an
outpatient community setting (Dole and Nyswander, 1965). The opposition of Harry
Anslinger against any type of maintenance therapy regardless if it was practiced in a
socially acceptable manner curtailed momentum for the methadone argument
temporarily. Courtwright (1982) explains that since prohibition minded policy had
proved counterproductive it seemed logical to revert back to supplying addicts cheap
legal drugs just as long as they were not the addict‟s drug of choice. The idea was further
legitimized by President Kennedy‟s welcome of research into the feasibility of providing
ambulatory care for addicts. Also, the Supreme Court decision Robinson v. California
provided additional momentum for the idea of maintenance treatment because it
established that narcotic addiction was a disease and that addicts were the proper subjects
for medical treatment (Musto, 1973). Anslinger would soon be resigning and in August
of 1962 after 32 years he left the FBN leaving the political climate for change ripe.
The Ad Hoc Panel was not as welcoming toward heroin maintenance as the ABA
and AMA Committee. But, it did signify a changing discourse and openness to new ideas
that would later facilitate the establishment of methadone as an acceptable treatment
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approach. Although it is not exactly clear why Anslinger resigned Trebach (1982)
explains it may have been a result of conflicting political agendas between the FBN and
the progressive Kennedys administration. Anslinger‟s approach consisted of campaigns
aimed at negative drug imagery, stiff mandatory sentences, and the consensus of the
nation‟s institutions of law and medicine against drug tolerance (Musto, 1973). No single
official in the drug abuse field would ever match the fearsome power that Anslinger
maintained for over three decades.
Consequently, after Anslinger left the FBN a trend toward developing humane
approaches to addiction including methadone began to take form (Trebach, 1982). The
Kennedy Administration blatantly threatened these old forms of control by publically
welcoming a more humane and medical approach toward addiction. Anslingers grand exit
combined with a new progressive thinking presidential administration meant the political
climate was changing and the old ways of punishing addicts using mandatory sentences
and stints at the Narcotic Farms was no longer socially acceptable (Trebach, 1982).
Although the 1962 Ad Hoc Panel did not openly express support for heroin maintenance
it did call for additional research to identify more effective methods of drug treatment.
The President would revisit the issue once again in 1963 when he appointed a second
Advisory Commission on Narcotic Drug Abuse.
On November 1, 1963 only weeks before the president‟s assassination the new
Advisory Commission recommended that Federal regulations be amended to reflect the
general principle that the medical treatment of a narcotic addict is to be determined by the
medical profession (Trebach, 1982). The president‟s recommendation if successfully
enacted could have in fact reversed the old interpretation of the Harrison Act upheld by
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the Webb and Doremus decisions, which redefined physician autonomy and banned
narcotic maintenance. The second Advisory Commission also recommended a network of
small community-based hospitals specializing in addiction treatment to reduce the
number of individuals under restraint in state mental hospitals (Trebach, 1982). The
recommendations of the 1963 Commission could have been a game changer because the
president planned to restore the autonomy back to the medical community so that
addiction could be treated as a legitimate disease instead of a stigmatized social
condition. This of course did not happen and his successor President Johnson ignored the
Committee‟s and Kennedy‟s recommendations. The assassination of President Kennedy
was not only a national tragedy but it also meant his progressive agenda that was
uprooting old institutions of control such as the FBI, CIA, and FBN would be largely
abandoned (Trebach, 1982).
In his tenure as President, Lyndon Johnson did fulfill one recommendation of
Kennedy‟s 1963 Advisory Commission on Narcotic Drugs although it was three years
later. The Narcotic Rehabilitation Act (NARA) of 1966 was the first concrete sign that a
powerful political consensus had developed regarding the need for non-punitive
approaches to addiction (Trebach, 1982). Ideally, the law would create an alternative to
incarceration for some first time federal drug offenders as long as there were non-violent
offenders. However, repeat offenders were excluded from the option for treatment and
the program never served more than 1,723 individuals between 1968 and 1979. The
debate regarding heroin maintenance during the Johnson administration was practically
non-existent and would not resurface again until the mid-1970s. This was largely in part
because methadone was seen as being a more practical and socially acceptable alternative
53

to heroin due to it promising ability to stabilize addicts while reducing their illicit drug
use (Trebach, 1982).

Throughout much of the 1960s, the problem of drug addiction

including heroin use was on the rise in all strata of society. However, the problem
disproportionately affected poor marginalized groups as well as inner city Black and
Latino populations. Musto (1973) explains that the 1960s broke through the brittle shell
of defense that rejected old perceptions of drug use that was laughable to the new
emerging counterculture. There was also a growing prison system that would be
overwhelmed by a small fraction of those who continued to break drug laws. But there
was a great hope that methadone would provide a partial solution to reducing crime and
increasing productivity among heroin dependent persons who were thought to be
responsible for a significant level of property crime. Methadone may have failed to live
up to its early hype but it did establish for the first time since the old narcotics clinics
were dismantled that maintenance using legal opiates was once again socially acceptable.
THE COUNTERCULTURE AND THE SOCIAL UPHEAVAL OF THE 1960s
The 1960s was indeed an explosive time full of controversial wars, civil protests,
and vibrant creativity of a generation who were encouraged to tune in turn on and drop
out. According to Wesson (2011) the Vietnam War, institutionalized racism, and
conflicting gender roles fueled social upheaval and political activism. Herwitt (2006)
explains that the counterculture represented a major digression in mainstream American
society as young people began to question the American way of life. This departure from
traditional normative values also facilitated increased drug use.

Moynihan (2002)

explains drug use among young people was a great cause for concern in the 1960s and it
has increased to epidemic levels mutating as epidemics do.
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Heroin addiction was

ravaging the slums, LSD plagued prep schools, and cocaine the drug of choice for the
1970s was transgressing to crack (Moynihan, 2002). Although heroin addiction was
steadily increasing throughout the 1960s socially constructed crime myths created in
nonscientific forums were used to sensationalize drug use (Kappeler and Potter, 2005).
According to Musto (1973) in 1971 over 24 million Americans reported using
marijuana, and in 1975 five percent of all Americans reported using LSD. Heroin use had
also witnessed significant growth although it is never easy to estimate this cohort of drug
users. From 1960 the number of heroin users rose from about 50,000 to roughly half a
million by 1970. Intravenous heroin use was the dominate method of delivery resulting
in an increased number of Hepatitis cases from 4,000 in 1966 to 36,000 in 1971 (Musto,
1973). The heroin sniffers of the old days were replaced by a group of largely poor
marginalized users who demanded a more powerful method of delivery. Consequently,
the spread of intravenous drug use was also the product of diluted street heroin that was
relatively low in potency as it was adulterated by traffickers and pushers who controlled
the black-market supply (Courtwright, 1982). Cheap heroin flooded the streets of D.C,
New York, Chicago, and Detroit as a result of increased smuggling activity through the
French Connection and some even claim heroin was brought in through the U.S.
military‟s very own cargo plans and freighters (McCoy, 1972).
The French Connection controlled by the Corsican Crime family, Paul Carbone
and Francois Spirito, manufactured heroin from opium that was grown in Turkey and
Indochina. The opium was transported to France where it was refined into heroin and was
then transported to Canada where it was smuggled to its final destination: the thriving
black-market of the United States (McCoy, 1972). Stories also surfaced that heroin was
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being smuggled by U.S. soldiers on cargo planes coming back from Vietnam. And some
even suggest that the CIA contributed to the trafficking of heroin into the U.S. throughout
the Vietnam War. This theme was explored by Alford McCoy‟s (1972) book the Politics
of Heroin which implicated that the CIA was complicit in aiding the Southeast Asian
heroin trade. McCoy even testified in front of a congressional hearing that heroin was
being transported and smuggled from Laos and Burma using Air America which was
covertly owned and operated by the CIA. There were also widespread incidences of
heroin abuse within the U.S. armed forces and in 1971 Army medical personnel
estimated that approximately 10 to 15 percent of low ranking enlisted men in Vietnam
used heroin (Breecher, 1972). The U.S. heroin trade was indeed fruitful during this period
and the surge of users from 50,000 in 1966 to over half a million in 1971 is indicative
that the drug had found an effective entry point into the country (Kuzmarov, 2009).
Whether it be through the French Connection, or CIA controlled air carriers is up for
interpretation. What is evident is that there was a growing heroin epidemic in Americans
urban centers and President Nixon promised to balance law enforcement efforts with
access to effective drug treatment which matriculated to the War on Drugs along with a
growing reliance on methadone clinics.
NIXON AND THE DRUG WAR
It was not until 1964 that methadone was used for maintenance therapy by Dr.
Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander from Rockefeller University. According to Dole and
Nyswander (1965) when studying the effects of methadone the physicians witnessed
dramatic improvements in their patients as they began to move about making their beds
and asking when they could go back to work. By the late 1960s the use of methadone
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began to spread far beyond the experimental stages and a number of outpatient clinics
were being developed in New York City, Chicago and D.C. According to Trebach (1982)
an executive briefing was provided to President Nixon about methadone‟s effectiveness
in reducing heroin use, and drug related crime. But, the memo also warned that the drug
could be morally and socially controversial because it allowed users to continue taking
the drugs as long as they needed. Musto (1973) explains methadone not only provided a
more humane solution to dangerous drug use but it was also a big step toward sanctioning
the most extreme anti-enforcement style, the provision of providing heroin itself to heroin
addicts.
President Nixon was less concerned with the therapeutic effectiveness of
methadone but saw it as a useful tool in combating the “War on Drugs” and a way to gain
political capital for potentially reducing the crime rate (Treabach, 1982). Although
Nixon accepted the use of methadone as a suitable treatment alternative for heroin
addiction other elements of his administrations drug policies were not as progressive. His
infamous declaration of the War on Drugs in 1971 called for an increase presence of state
control control agents, an acceptance of no knock warrants, and the revival of mandatory
sentencing in hopes of squashing the nation‟s growing drug problem (Treabach, 1982).
Nixon was also responsible for re-categorizing marijuana as a scheduled one drug which
implicated its abuse potential was the equivalent of heroin. Trebach (1982) explains that
the laws and regulations created during Nixon‟s presidency on the one hand increased the
scope and power of criminal sanctions involving drug use, but at the same time it also
increased funding expenditures for treatment.
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Much of this was achieved through the comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970. This was in fact the most far reaching single piece of drug
legislation since the Harrison Act as it sought to codify the numerous federal narcotics
laws and amendments that had been passed since the Opium Ban of 1887 (Trebach,
1982). The criminal provisions of the encompassing law covering drug possession, sales,
and trafficking was infinitively complex because it possessed both repressive and liberal
features (Trebach, 1982).

For example, mandatory minimums for first time drug

offenders had been largely abandoned in exchange for probation and court ordered
treatment. However, the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act maintained vague and
ambiguously worded provisions regarding asset forfeitures, fines, and long sentences. In
fact, the law allowed life sentences to be imposed for those convicted of multiple
offenses or if one was determined by the courts to be a “dangerous special drug
offender.” However, there was a softer albeit less publicized side to the Nixon
administration‟s drug policy that maintained a distinct progressive and even liberal tone
(Treabach, 1982). Behind Nixon‟s public declarations to fearlessly combat drug use and
crime he appointed a group of liberal, predominately Democratic drug abuse experts, to
consider the utility of a medical model of drug policy (Treabach, 1982).
METHADONE MAINTENANCE
Ironically, the same day President Nixon declared the War on Drugs he also
created the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, commonly known as
SAODAP. According to Treabach (1982) SAODAP was in many ways a promising
public policy that was headed by some of the nation‟s foremost experts in the field of
addiction treatment. Jerome Jaffe, a psychiatrist and the first director of SAODAP along
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with Robert DuPont and others were given the task to pioneer more humane treatment
options for addicted persons. SAODAP‟s main objectives were: coordinating all the drug
abuse activities of the entire Federal bureaucracy to reduce overlap; expand treatment for
heroin addicts, oversee and coordinate the intervention of addicts coming back from
Vietnam; create science based research that would gain a better understand of the disease
of addiction to name a few (Treabach, 1982). SAODAP was also a strong proponent of
methadone maintenance and was instrumental in establishing a network of clinics in
urban cities across the United States.
Prior to being named the head of the SAODAP, Jerome Jaffe actually piloted a
methadone program in Chicago and argued the best solution to the heroin problem was
increasing access to methadone clinics (Kleber, 2002). By 1973, there were an estimated
400 methadone clinics throughout the United State and historian Herbert Kleber (2002)
coined the 1970s the Golden era of methadone. Surprisingly, a country who only fifty
years ago rejected the idea of maintenance under the pretext that maintaining an addict
simply for the sake of satisfying his appetite for narcotics and keeping him comfortable
was now embracing the idea of narcotic maintenance as long as it was methadone. Musto
(1973) explains that methadone maintenance during the Nixon Administration illustrates
a great compromise between simple toleration of drug use and the public‟s demand that
heroin related crime be curbed. Addicts received something to assuage their drug craving
just not their drug of choice. Nonetheless, hopes were high during the late 1960s and
early 1970s that methadone could offer a solution to the countries highly sensationalized
heroin problem.
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Overall, methadone is an effective withdraw aid and maintenance tool and about
34% of patients who leave treatment on their own terms remain sober (Joseph, Stancliff
and Langrod, 2000). Compared to strictly abstinence based programs that have more or
less a 10% success rate, methadone is the more effective choice especially among
intravenous heroin users. Early clinical trials involving methadone conducted by Dole
and Nyswander (1965) revealed that the drug is effective in relieving narcotic hunger,
opiate withdrawal symptoms, and it blocks the euphoric effect of heroin. The same study
also found with a comprehensive program of rehabilitation patients saw marked
improvements in their social life such as reconciling family relationships, gaining
employment, and going back to school (Dole and Nyswander, 1965). Compared to
heroin, the toxicity of methadone is relatively low and adverse physical effects are mild.
Although methadone maintenance has a higher success rate than strictly
abstinence-based drug treatment, the program has several practical concerns and
limitations worth noting (Joseph, Stancliff and Langrod, 2000). For example, increased
rates of cocaine use have been noted among methadone maintenance patients. Also, risk
of overdose is increased when methadone is mixed with benzodiazepines (Inciardi and
Harrision, 2002). In some cases methadone has been linked to causing long term lung and
respiratory problems (Inciardi and Harrision, 2002). Also, because of methadone‟s long
half live the withdrawal process has been noted as being as severe as heroin which could
contribute for patient‟s reluctance to detox from the drug. There was also conflicting
evidence regarding methadone‟s true effect on reducing crime. Questions began to
emerge as to the validity of Dole and Nyswanders‟ early claims that methadone produced
statistically significant effects on reducing criminal activity among participants.
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Vorenberg and Lukoff (1973) in their study found that while 94% of addicts were not
arrested during their first year of treatment, 80% of the same sample had not been
arrested during the year prior to beginning methadone treatment. As doubts began to
emerge as to methadone‟s ability to deliver on the Nixon‟s administrations promise to
reduce drug related crime the debate regarding heroin maintenance resurfaced once again.
THE VERA INSTITUTE PROPOSES HEROIN TRIAL
The conversation involving heroin maintenance received little public attention
since the ABA and AMA Committee of 1956 subtly suggested developing an
experimental trial. MacCoun and Ruter (2001) explain that in the early 1970s serious
consideration was given to developing a heroin maintenance trial in New York City. The
Vera Institute (1975) in its proposal recommended an experimental trial involving 300
male heroin addicts that had been deemed treatment resistant. The study proposed
providing injectable heroin in a clinic setting for approximately six months where the
participants would then be transferred to either methadone maintenance or a traditional
abstinence program. The rationale behind the proposal was to bring recalcitrant addicts
into treatment where they could then be prepared for more conventional programs.
The Vera Institute had been impressed with the British System of reducing heroin
addiction to manageable numbers and felt a similar model should be tried in a highly
controlled clinical setting in the U.S. (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).

The proposal

recommended trying the model first with 30 or so patients and later expanding it to treat
300 addicts. Although the proposal had the backing of prominent addiction specialists
and even some law enforcement officials it was met with stiff criticisms from the medical
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community and policy makers. There was also intense opposition from conservative
political groups and traditional anti-drug forces (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Also,
African Americans were suspicious of the proposal citing it was a means to reduce Black
anger following the urban riots of the late 1960s. MaCoun and Reuter (2001) explain the
proposal received considerably harsh press and even the liberal New York Times
published negative stories citing a Swiss Psychiatrist who claimed that you could easily
get up to three or four million heroin addicts within five years of the program. Ironically,
in the 1990s the Swiss would pioneer a heroin maintenance program that would further
legitimize it‟s standing as a feasible treatment option.
Proponents of the program stood behind the premise that providing heroin in a
strict clinical setting would significantly reduce the Country‟s heroin problem. Opponents
of the proposal wasted no time in forming a Congressional Ad Hoc Committee that
resulted in legislation blocking the FDA from approving the trial. MacCoun and Reuter
(2001) explain with so many enemies and few notable supporters the proposal was
rejected and quietly disappeared. Consequently, the hostility of the proposals‟ critics
squashed efforts that could have better informed both sides of the debate by providing
scientifically substantiated evidence (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Although the Vera
Institutes‟ recommendation was unsuccessful it does illustrate the continuity of the debate
regarding heroin maintenance. The issue would be revisited in years to come and the
Swiss and Dutch trials of the 1990s would provide compelling evidence as to the
program‟s effectiveness in maintaining heroin addicts in a safe and ethical manner while
also reducing drug related harms.
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CHAPTER V

HEROIN MAINTENANCE: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A U.S.
EXPERIMENT

Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1990s methadone
remained the dominant treatment approach to heroin addiction and there was a great hope
among public health organizations that the drug would significantly reduce the addict
population. Although studies have consistently upheld its effectiveness compared to
abstinence based programs, methadone maintenance has received criticism for its
inability to decrease illicit drug use among participants (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). In
addition, less than half of entrants stay in methadone maintenance for more than a year
and studies have found many participants remain involved in high risk health and crime
behaviors while in the program. Another increasing concern for methadone maintenance
treatment or MMT is that they are slowly becoming privatized by for-profit
organizations.
In 1973, over 400 methadone clinics received funding from the federal
government (Trebach, 1982). Today that number is considerably lower and currently less
than half of MMTs in the U.S. are publically funded. According to SAMHSA (2010), in
2008 half of all patients attending a MMT program were self-pay clients paying fees
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ranging from $13-25 dollars a day making it a billion dollar a year industry. Musto
(2002) explains, that the rise in privately owned methadone programs has resulted in a
curtailment of effective services that has become more profit oriented and less about
patients‟ well-being. My position is not to dismiss methadone‟s role in managing the
addict population but it should illuminate that as a stand-alone approach it has fallen
short. Forty plus years of MMT reveals that there is not enough compliance among
heroin addicts to reap substantial societal and public health benefits from the program.
The following chapter discusses Switzerland‟s experimentation with heroin maintenance
and examines the growing trend across Western Europe to implement clinical trials of
heroin assisted treatment. Moreover, it touches upon the drug related harms and public
health concerns that are a result of heroin addiction and how access heroin assisted
treatment could reduce such harms. It also examines more recent attempts to implement
heroin maintenance trials in the U.S. and accesses the likelihood of HAT in this country.
THE SHOOTING GALLERY
The overall number of heroin users declined briefly in the late 1970s as young
people were seeking out less socially stigmatizing drugs such as powder cocaine. The
large cohort of users that fueled the first heroin injection wave from 1965-1974 were
dying out and there was a brief downward trend of new recruits to replace the old users
(Musto, 2002). There were still over 250,000 heroin users in New York City alone and
throughout the 1980s and 1990s the overall number of heroin addicts in the U.S. would
stay consistent with approximately 500,000 to 750,000 users (Musto, 2002).
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In the 1970s a trend emerged known as the “shooting gallery” where addicts
could gather and either buy or rent used syringes and other works to inject heroin or
cocaine. Galleries usually operated out of abandoned houses where users gathered
together to inject heroin, enjoy the high, and socialize. For a group of individuals who
lived outside of the norms of conventional society the shooting gallery was simply more
than just a place to get high. It also functioned as an integral part of the subculture.
Consequently, the shooting gallery would also facilitate the widespread transmission of
blood borne diseases and by the mid-1980s anywhere from a third to half of New York
city‟s intravenous drug users were infected with HIV (Des Jarlais, 1989). Even today in
light of what we know about HIV and its prevalence among intravenous drug users
needle sharing is still a common practice largely because of the federal governments
thirty year ban on funding for needle exchange programs.
When faced with the AIDS crisis England reacted quite differently and embraced
a more harm reductionist approach. Musto (2002) explains the British made a conscious
decision in the mid-1980s that preventing the spread of AIDS was far more important
than eliminating drug use and their main priority was to curtail the spread of HIV rather
than focus solely on abstinence. This approach conflicted with American idealism that
proposed simply lowering expatiations of drug users would produce dismal societal
consequences (Musto, 2002).

Other countries would follow suit and adopt harm

reductionist policies that attempted to reduce the severity of negative outcomes
associated with heroin addiction. The Swiss experimentation with heroin maintenance is
of special importance because it was the first country since England that proposed
providing pharmaceutical heroin to chronic users in a clinical setting. Today the British
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have largely abandoned the practice and by 1975 only 4% of maintained opiate addicts
were receiving a prescription for heroin (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).

The Swiss

government became intrigued with the British‟s use of heroin maintenance and even the
U.S.‟s early experimentation with narcotics clinics leading them to develop a similar
model as a response to its growing heroin problem.
THE SWISS APPROACH
In recent years, the debate regarding heroin maintenance has become synonymous
with the Swiss trials that began in the mid-1990s. In the early 1980s cities such as Zurich
and Geneva witnessed a dramatic influx of heroin addiction and as an initial response the
Swiss government allowed the operation of an open-air drug market called the Platzpitz
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). The rationale behind the Platzpitz or “needle park” as it
was also called was to minimize the intrusiveness of the drug markets, and increase the
delivery of low threshold services to users such as needle exchange and access to
methadone treatment. Consequently, addicts from all over Switzerland began to migrate
to Zurich and the Platzpitz became the hub of the heroin black-market. City officials and
most of the local citizens categorize the Platzpitz experiment as a woeful failure.
According to MacCoun and Reuter (2001) crime doubled in the downtown area close to
the Platzpitz and rival gang wars resulted in an upsurge of homicides prompting the city
to close “needle park” in 1992.
After closing the open air drug scene the Swiss government proposed
implementing a heroin maintenance trial involving addicts who had failed in
conventional treatment programs. The trials sparked harsh international controversy
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largely from the U.S. and the International Narcotics Control Board (a UN agency) who
warned that the experimental program would send a disastrous signal to countries in
which opium was cultivated to increase production flooding the black-market with heroin
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). The INCB director general also claimed that heroin
maintenance would equivocate to playing with fire and urged the Swiss government to
reconsider its proposal. Even in the face of such criticism and pressure from the
international community the Swiss proceeded with the trials and surprisingly the majority
of Swiss citizens supported the government‟s proposal.

In 1992, the Swiss Federal

Office of public health authorized HAT trials in Zurich, Bern, Basel, and Geneva
involving 1,000 heroin addicts who had failed in conventional treatment programs. In
1994, the first heroin maintenance clinics were opened as part of a three year national
trial that provided pharmaceutical heroin as a supplement to the Country‟s methadone
maintenance program. MacCoun and Reuter (2001) explain outcomes of the early trials
were positive prompting the Swiss Federal government to approve a large scale
expansion of the program that sought to accommodate 15% of the countries some 30,000
heroin addicts.
The motivation for the trials was complex and some Swiss officials explain it was
an effort to stall a growing legalization movement. Unlike U.S. policy makers the Swiss
government was more hesitant to be “tough” on enforcement efforts that included the
incarceration of drug users, but they were also offended by the unsightliness of the open
air drug scene. The implementation of the trials was also an important step in reducing
the prevalence of HIV among heroin addicts because participants would be given clean
syringes and taught safe injection practices. MacCoun and Reuter (2001) explain that an
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elaborate governance structure was developed to protect public health from any adverse
consequences stemming from the program. For example, participants in the trial were
ordered to render their drivers licenses to reduce incidence of driving while intoxicated.
The Swiss government also agreed it had an ethical obligation to continue to provide
heroin to participants after the trials were over.
SWISS FINDINGS
The first randomized clinical trial of the program concluded overall heroin
maintenance is a feasible and clinically effective treatment for heroin addicts who fail at
conventional drug treatment (Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino, 1998). The initial trial
involved three groups of patients receiving different types of injectable opiates: 250
received diamorphine (heroin), 250 received morphine, and 200 received methadone. In
the early months of the trial patients receiving injectable morphine experienced such
discomfort the researchers removed it from the trial. There were also problems with
injectable methadone and patients were reluctant to accept it so the final evaluation
focused only on the experimental group receiving injectable heroin. Participants were
required to be at least 20 years old, have two years of history injecting heroin, and failed
two previous attempts at conventional treatment (Perneger et. al., 1998). The average
patient was 33 years old with 12 years‟ experience injecting and had eight unsuccessful
attempts at treatment. An important stipulation of the trial allowed patients to choose the
dose they felt they needed and this autonomy was believed to reduce incentive to
supplement their dose with illicit heroin. Patients could receive heroin three times daily
and injected under the supervision of a nurse who could monitor their health status.
Patients were not permitted under any circumstance to take the heroin outside of the
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clinic setting which ensured the drug would not be leaked into the black-market. There
was no incidence of overdose reported during the trial and compliance was also high and
most patients met the requirements of daily attendance, and randomized drug testing
(Perneger et. al. 1998).
Outcomes were generally very positive and retention in treatment was higher than
those in methadone programs. Moreover, 69% of patients remained in the program after
18 months and about half of those who dropped out opted for either methadone
maintenance or abstinence based modalities. Perneger et. al. (1998) suggests, that once
patients discovered the limitations of having unrestricted access to the drug that had been
the focal point of their lives for so long many were finally able to quit. This finding
strengthens the argument for heroin maintenance because it legitimizes the premise when
addicts are given no restrictions to the drug they are able to focus on the underlying
psychosocial causes of their addiction. The study also revealed that synthetic heroin does
not have a neurotoxic effect on patients any more than methadone or morphine. The trials
proved that in most instances patients could be maintained safely on diamorphine and the
most common side effect reported was constipation.
Participants in the heroin group were also given comprehensive psychosocial
services that included individual and group counseling and access to low threshold health
care services. Crime rates among participants also fell about 60% and this statistic was
corroborated by local law enforcement arrest records (Perneger et. al., 1998).
Employment outcomes also increased from 14% to 32% and many patients reported that
participation in the trial increased their social functioning so they could pursue legitimate
job opportunities. Mental and physical health status also improved and out of the entire
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sample only 3 new incidences of HIV were reported which was linked to illicit cocaine
use outside the clinic. Perneger et. al. (1998) concluded, that the patients on heroin
maintenance no longer used street heroin and significantly reduced their use of other
drugs such as benzodiazepines and cocaine. Social functioning also improved
dramatically and many patients reported their housing situation improved and they
developed more social ties outside the drug scene and improved relationships with family
members. Dependency on street life also decreased sharply in the experimental group and
the study found income from illegal activities such as dealing drugs, commercial sex, and
theft decreased significantly. These results suggest that heroin maintenance seems to
have a broader effect on the participant‟s entire life-style by stabilizing their daily routine
through the commitment of attending the clinic daily, giving them the opportunity for
psychosocial support, and by keeping them away from open drug scenes (Perneger,
Giner, del Rio and Mino, 1998). The Swiss trials also proved that the program can exist
in an urban area with no major disturbance to surrounding neighborhoods nor did it
increase risk to public health.
Overall, the Swiss trial indicates that heroin maintenance is a socially acceptable,
effective, and feasible form of treatment for those who do not fare well in traditional
programs. However, it should be noted that the study did reveal several limitations
regarding heroin maintenance. One major concern was recruitment into the trial was
lower than expected and there was less demand for the program than was initially
anticipated (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). The low numbers of enrollment is likely a
result of the demanding schedule of the clinic where patients were required to visit three
times daily. A second concern is the high cost of obtaining pharmaceutical heroin and the
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program proved to be far more expensive that methadone maintenance. MacCoun and
Reuter (2001) explain that the daily cost per day for each patient is about 50 Francs or 35
dollars which is twice the cost of operating a methadone maintenance clinic. The cost
benefit analysis of the trial revealed that the program was saving the Swiss tax payers an
estimated 96 francs a day in jail stays, court cost, and health care costs for each patient
attending the program. Moreover, the evaluation of the Swiss trials does not distinguish
between the effects of heroin itself and the effects of other psychosocial and medical
services offered to participants. It is indeed possible that the comprehensive services
might have had an impact on positive outcomes over the administration of heroin alone.
However, it is more probable that the psychosocial services enhanced the overall
effectiveness of the daily administration of heroin (Perneger, Giner, del Rio and Mino,
1998). Also, because the initial groups of injectable morphine and methadone were
removed from the study there were no other randomized control groups to compare
outcomes from the experimental group. Instead, outcomes from the group receiving
injectable heroin were compared to outcomes from nonequivalent groups of methadone
and abstinence based programs.
Currently, there are 23 clinics across Switzerland that offer heroin maintenance
serving about 7% of the country‟s overall addict population. Nordt and Stohler (2006)
found that on average patients stay in the program about three years and afterwards less
than 15% relapse back into daily heroin use. There have also been significant reductions
in heroin use in Switzerland following the implementation of HAT. For example, in
Zurich alone from 1990 to 2002 there was an 82% reduction of daily heroin use. Nodrt
and Stohler (2006) also explain that the decrease in heroin abuse is also a consequence of
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fewer recruits being introduced to the drug through peer influences. Because older
addicts were diverted into opiate substitution programs there was less incentive to
introduce the drug to new recruits. Arrest rates also declined significantly in the decade
following the implantation of HAT programs. Reuter and Schnoz (2009) found that
heroin related arrest declined from 18,000 in 1997 to 6500 in 2006. Nordt and Stohler
(2006) explain the Swiss approach goes far beyond providing heroin maintenance and the
government developed a four pillar strategy that emphasized on treatment and other harm
reduction measures. There was also a conscious effort by the Swiss government to
change the image of heroin use from a nonconformist rebellious act to a chronic disease
that needs therapy. The Swiss more so than any other country to date have embraced a
continuum of harm reduction modalities and as a result they have witnessed marked
improvements in public health as well as reductions in illicit drug use and related crime.
REACTIONS TO THE SWISS EXPERIMENTATION WITH HAT
Even in spite of its methodological flaws the early evaluations of the Swiss trials
were encouraging and substantiate the premise that heroin maintenance can effectively
reduce the social, legal, and public health harms that are a direct result of illicit heroin
use. The Swiss trials also made a compelling argument that heroin maintenance
combined with the exposure to psychosocial services could facilitate a patient‟s choice to
seek out more traditional treatment programs. When the daily chase to obtain illicit
heroin is eliminated and the user has the autonomy to choose their dose this allowed
participants to focus their energy on addressing the underlying psychosocial issues that
might facilitate their drug use. The position taken here is not to imply that heroin
maintenance is an appropriate treatment for all addicts and there are indeed risks and
72

limitations associated with the implementation of a large scale HAT program. However,
if we could examine heroin maintenance in terms of evidence based practices and omit
the socially constructed ideas and fears that polarize our ability to embrace new treatment
modalities perhaps we could engage in a constructive debate about HAT‟s potential role
in American society.
In the U.S. opponents of HAT argue that giving addicts their drug of choice sets a
dangerous precedent that would establish a slippery slope toward drug legalization.
Trebach (1982) explains that in U.S. society it is seen as “sinful” for policymakers to take
into account the tastes of drug users, however, those tastes must be recognized as the
most important elements in the rational design of future policies. European countries such
as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Canada have
been more accepting of this premise as each of these countries have implemented either
HAT trials or mandated permanent maintenance programs (Fischer, Rehm, Kirst, Casas,
Hall, Krausz, & Van Ree, 2002). It is also important to note neither of these countries
have legalized heroin although U.S. critics of the program frame their argument against
HAT around the hypothetical fear that it would lead to drug legalization.
Instead of reacting with enthusiasm to the Swiss findings the international
community focused primarily on the methodological weaknesses of the evaluations and
accused the Swiss of social irresponsibility. The U.S. was among one of the programs
most ardent critics yet these criticisms come from a country that maintains the highest
global drug incarceration rates and the highest incidence of drug related violence
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Yet little international condemnation has been directed
toward the U.S. and it burgeoning prison population of drug offenders. Although most
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Americans have come to the realization that the forty year “War on Drugs” has failed we
still cling to the same policies that promote incarceration and enforcement efforts that are
socially harmful and ultimately ineffective (Alexander, 2010).
The position of this thesis is not to imply that as a stand-alone program heroin
maintenance could solve the U.S. drug problem or even eradicate illicit heroin use. But,
conducting carefully regulated clinically controlled trials of HAT in the U.S. could ignite
a national debate promoting a continuum of harm reductionist strategies that could
ultimately reduce our reliance on incarceration and enforcement efforts. In the U.S. there
remains an implied tolerance of ineffective socially harmful institutions and drug policies
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Even in spite of the positive findings from Swiss trials
there is little tolerance for alternative programs such as HAT because American idealism
clings to the notion that all addicts can live drug free lives if they are presented with
enough punitive sanctions and treatment attempts.

This type of circular reasoning

implies that our country‟s drug laws and policies are more aligned with political
ideologies as opposed to the pragmatic evaluation of what works. However, if we look to
our European counterparts we can see an emerging trend that promotes harm reduction
policies which is reshaping how drug abuse is approached.
NAOMI TRIALS IN VANCOUVER AND MONTREAL
Currently in the U.S. there is a growing acceptance of harm reductionist policies
such as needle exchange programs, naloxone distribution and increased access to
methadone and suboxone substitution therapies. There are also a growing number of
harm reduction alliance groups who advocate for the development of HAT trials although
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the issue remains an inflammatory concept and the majority of the political and medical
establishment still ardently oppose it largely on moral and ideological grounds. The U.S.
debate regarding HAT has received renewed interest after the Canadian government
proposed implementing trials in Vancouver and Montreal. The Canadian trials illustrate
an important milestone in the trajectory of HAT because it was the first time such an
approach was attempted in North America since the old U.S. narcotics clinics.
The motivation for the Vancouver trials stemmed largely from the city‟s
burgeoning addicted population located in the East Hastings neighborhood in the
downtown east side of the city. In 2008, it was estimated that over 40% of the 10,000
East Hastings residents were HIV positive largely as a result of IV drug use (Adilman
and Kliewer, 2000). The Vancouver neighborhood also known as “Skid Row” maintains
the highest incidence of HIV in the industrialized world. There are an estimated 5,000 IV
drug users living in East Hasting costing the city millions in health care, law enforcement
efforts and lost productivity. In light of the Swiss and Dutch experience with heroin
assisted treatment the North American Opiate Medication Initiative (NAOMI) proposed a
similar model be tried in Vancouver and Montreal.
The NAOMI trials although controversial and harshly criticized by U.S. officials
revealed overall positive findings and marked reductions in illicit drug use and criminal
activity among participants.

The trials began in 2005 and concluded in 2008 and

involved 251 participants with 115 receiving injectable diamorphine (heroin) and 111
receiving oral methadone. The study found a 67% reduction in illicit drug use or other
illegal activities among the experimental group of injectable heroin compared to 47%
receiving oral methadone (Oviedo-Joekes, Brissette, Marsh, Lauzon, Guh, Anis and
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Schechter, 2009). The same study concluded that the diamorphine group had significant
improvements over the oral methadone group with respect to medical and psychiatric
status, economic stability, employment situation and family and social relations. These
findings substantiate that diamorphine has a treatment effect beyond simply reducing
illicit drug use and involvement in illegal activities.
The NAOMI trials received a hostile reaction from the Bush Administration and
Drug Czar John Walters called the experiment "state sponsored suicide" (Gartry, OviedoJokes, Laliberte, and Schechter, 2009). But, evidence from program evaluations reveal
there was not a single fatality during the trial involving the experimental group receiving
heroin. From the naive U.S. perspective it would be simpler if everyone could just say no
to drugs. And it is this basic assumption that is driving the majority of our nation‟s drug
policies with little regard to science, innovation or compassion. Ironically enough, many
of the countries who utilize HAT were in fact inspired by the old U.S. narcotic clinics
although the role of these clinics is largely omitted in the modern debate involving heroin
maintenance. Providing HAT in the U.S. could help to reach heroin dependent persons
who remain outside the current treatment system and who contribute disproportionately
to health care and criminal justice cost (Gartry, Oviedo-Jokes, Laliberte, and Schechter,
2009). Access to HAT could also increase contact with vital mental and health care
services while also providing a humane and cost effective treatment modality.
Another consideration is that although HAT has proven to be feasible and
effective in well organized and wealthy European countries, it could prove difficult to
implement in diverse cultural and political societies such as the U.S. Perhaps the recent
findings of the NAOMI trials could provide a counter argument to this premise because
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the U.S. and Canada are more comparable in terms of social context. MacCoun and
Reuter (2001) touch upon another consideration and explain the argument for heroin
maintenance presents a major ethical paradox. For instance, there is something strange
about the notion that on one hand you prohibit a drug, but then an exception is made for
those who cause sufficient damage to themselves and society as a consequence of their
violation to prohibition. This paradox alone does not make maintenance a bad policy
however it does raise some ethical concerns that could hamper efforts to implement it in
the United States (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001).
IS AN EXPERIMENT LIKELY?
A compelling case for a HAT in the U.S. has not been made since the Vera
Institute proposed a trial in New York City in the 1970s. But, in 1998 researchers at John
Hopkins University, along with drug policy experts from around the world gathered at the
New York Academy of Medicine to discuss the feasibility of a HAT trial in the U.S.
Supporters of the program argued Baltimore would be an appropriate setting for such an
experiment because the city has traditionally experienced high rates of heroin abuse and
drug related crime. Baltimore‟s Health Commissioner Dr. Peter Beilenson publically
supported the program and advocated that the study be attempted in light of the positive
findings from the Swiss trials. The initiative was also supported by the Lindesmith Center
who offered funding for the trial if it received approval from the Food and Drug
Administration (Shane, 1998). The proposal was squashed before it had the chance to be
considered for FDA approval due to the outcry of political opposition that argued giving
addicts heroin would send a disastrous message that would undermine prohibition efforts.
One supporter of the Baltimore initiative explains that the biggest prohibition in the
77

United States is not on drugs but instead the discussion of new solutions and the rejection
of the proposal substantiates this claim (Shane, 1998). However, it would not be the last
time the City of Baltimore would attempt such a proposal and the issue resurfaced again a
decade later.
In 2009, drug policy expert Peter Reuter from the University of Maryland
revisited the issue by conducting a feasibility study for the city of Baltimore.

In

coordination with the Abell Foundation, Reuter made a case for implementing an
experimental trial and explained that heroin maintenance could remove 10% of
Baltimore‟s most troubled heroin addicts leading to substantial reductions in crime and
other issues that adversely affect the city. Reuter‟s proposal was dismissed by Baltimore
officials as being a radical endeavor that lacked evidence (Smith, 2009). The rejection of
Baltimore proposal illustrates the uphill battle advocates of the program face even in spite
of the positive finding regarding HAT‟s effectiveness.
The recent fatal heroin overdose of famous actor Phillip Seymour Hoffman has
facilitated a renewed interest on the subject. Although heroin addiction has been steadily
increasing over the past ten years the issue has received little attention from the Obama
administration or the media until Hoffman‟s death. Yet, the famous actor‟s overdose
represents only one of the estimated 10,000 heroin related deaths annually. Between
2006 and 2010 heroin overdose deaths have increased 45% and heroin use has increased
79% overall between 2007 and 2012. And in cities such as Cleveland heroin related
deaths are up 400 percent (Markon, 2014). Some experts explain the renewed interest in
heroin is a consequence of the crackdown on prescription opiates. The lack of
pharmaceutical opiates such as oxycodone has led many users to try a cheaper and more
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powerful substitute, heroin (Markon, 2014). A similar trend occurred during the early
1900s when opium and cocaine were banned leaving users in search of an alternative
such as heroin which would facilitated the first wave of heroin addiction in the United
States (Courtwright, 1982). Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the issue in a recent
Washington Post interview and explained that the heroin problem was of top priority for
the DOJ although he only proposed increasing enforcement efforts and improving access
to drug treatment and prevention (Markon, 2014). Holder gave no indication that
alternative approaches such as HAT were being considered.
At present, prospects for heroin maintenance in the U.S. are unlikely but not
outside of the realm of possibility. In the current political climate there seems to be little
room for new innovative ideas regarding drug treatment and we continue to support
policies that have repeatedly proven ineffective and socially harmful. In order for a HAT
trial to matriculate there would need to be a considerable level of acceptance from the
FDA, the National Institute of Drug Abuse in addition to local and federal political
support. The growing implementation of HAT in European countries and more recently
in Canada could strengthen the case for a U.S. experiment as the program continues to
produce positive outcomes. It is however ironic that a country who once supported the
use of narcotic maintenance and was the first to implement methadone maintenance is so
resistant to a program that could considerably reduce the harms, human suffering and
significant economic cost that are a direct result of illicit heroin abuse and its control.
There is indeed something troubling about a country who spends more resources, and
energy on a solution to heroin addiction that produces more harm and cost than the issue
itself causes.
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